

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Belize is located on the Eastern side of the Yucatan Peninsula where its shores are washed by the Caribbean Sea. To its North and Northwest is Mexico, while Guatemala lies along its Western and Southern Borders.

1.2 Formerly a British Colony known as British Honduras, Belize is an independent country with a Constitutional Monarchy, a Westminster Type Parliamentary System and a vibrant two party democracy. Its Constitution and Independent Judiciary protects individual rights and freedoms supported by a robust media and influential civil society.

1.3 Belize is a member of the UN, the British Commonwealth, CARICOM, OAS, SICA (excluding economic matters) and The Non Aligned Movement. It maintains membership in many important international and regional organizations.

1.4 The land mass of Belize is 8, 868 square miles with a population of 314,300 people. It is a tolerant multicultural society with a rich archeological heritage and diverse flora and fauna.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

1.5 The people of Belize are served by a Police Department consisting of 1,139 sworn members, 161 civilian and 54 paid Special Constables. This amounts to 1 sworn police officer to 263 citizens and 7.4 square miles. This includes paid Special Constables.

1.6 There is a Defense Force with a reservist element along with a British Military Force in training by arrangement between the Governments of Belize (GoB) and the United Kingdom (UK).

1.7 Belize is party to a number of bi-lateral and multi-lateral treaties, conventions, security arrangements and mechanisms. This includes the MOU between the United States Coast Guard Service and the Belize National Coast Guard Service for mutual cooperation for reducing demand, preventing illicit use and combating illicit production and trafficking of drugs, along with Extradition Treaties between the Government of Belize and many other countries. Belize also maintains harmonious relations with its neighbours and actively pursues cooperative security arrangements with them.

1.8 The Prime Minister chairs a National Security Council which reviews strategic issues commensurate with public safety and formulates related policies. A statutorily created Crime Control Council monitors the crime situation and has developed a crime reduction plan. There is also a National Security and Immigration Committee of the House of Representatives.

1.9 The GoB has a well articulated and comprehensive National Security Strategy with mandates for continuous oversight, implementation, coordination and review.

1.10 The Minister of National Security is responsible to the Cabinet and National Assembly for policing policies, effective management and performance of the Police Department, the Defense Force, Prison, Immigration Department, the National Coast Guard Service and Forensic Services. This ministry is managed by a Chief Executive Officer (CEO).

1.11 Constitutional and legal mechanisms create checks and balances and distributes authoritative decision making relating to public safety policies and the management and control of the Police Department. These authorities include the Governor General, the National Assembly; the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, along with the Minister of National Security, the Security Services Commission and the Commissioner of Police.

COST OF IMPLEMENTATION

1.12 This review aims to transform the Police Department so many of the recommendations involving costs are about resource reallocation, and rationalization for a greater economy. It is therefore estimated that **net savings will amount to approximately Bz \$5.0 M.** (See Appendix 1 B). This excludes previous commitments to implement the Memex Crime Information Management Systems (CIMS) and improvements to police communication infrastructure, the cost of which are being negotiated.

1.13 The Terms of Reference for this review are at Appendix 1 A.

DEDICATION OF STAFF

1.14 It was obvious to this reviewer that the large majority of the police officers are honest and patriotic Belizeans who are dedicated to the service of their country. None of the challenges enumerated in this review is any reflection on their loyalty and commitment.



Chapter 2

Terms of Reference:

Review Techniques and Resources Devoted to the Investigation of Crime and Make Recommendations

2.1 The National Crime Investigation Branch (NCIB) is managed by a Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) who answers to the Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP) Operations.

2.2 The Branch is staffed by 96 members consisting of 54 investigators and 42 support staff. This is approximately 8% of BPD strength. The case load is about 4 cases per detective weekly. They rely on the traditional retrospective case by case investigation of reported crimes with a marked dependence upon interviews, exhibits and statement collection as they assemble legal evidence pointing to a suspect or suspects. Scene of Crime Officers frequently gather what evidence they can but this aspect is rudimentary and limited by their training, their tools and limitations of the Forensic support known to exist at the National Forensic Laboratory. Another vital limitation on the quality of investigations is the absence of a Crime Information Management Strategy (CIMS) and Systems with mechanism for frequent tactical assessments and evaluation. All this has led to consequential weakness of quality assurance; follow through in difficult cases along with chronic underdevelopment of human capital in the Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB).

2.3 There are nonetheless many good senior detectives with a network of helpful Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) who produce results sometimes in high profile cases where the senior detectives are given time and funds to focus on the investigations of a particular case. What the evidence reveals is little development of the human cognitive capital and obsolete management and supporting intelligence and analytical systems necessary to transform the NCIB into an efficient and modern Investigative Branch.

THE DECLINE OF WITNESSES

2.4 Growing urban criminality supported by counter cultural responses such as the glamorization of violence and the instrumental and symbolic use of fear has led to a decline in the cooperation of witnesses in criminal investigations. In response, the CIB is transitioning too slowly towards greater reliance on forensic evidence; improved surveillance, communication and Information Technology and organized covert human penetration of the criminal fraternity which would enable the police to catch offenders “in the act” or convict with less non-police witness support.


2.5 Analysis of all murder cases before the Supreme Court from February 2003 to July 2008 shows that 22% of all acquittals for murder were due to the failure of witnesses to testify in accordance with statements given to the police or who could not be found.

1. The solution WHICH IS RECOMMENDED is to strengthen the law and procedure relating to charges and trial for perjury. This would entail;

- The police obtaining early sworn depositions from complainants and witnesses.***
- Provide for their safety in an improved protection programme in appropriate cases along with greater legal protection.***
- Legislate for long sentences of imprisonment for perjury with CONDITIONS FOR THEIR RELEASE if those convicted give evidence conforming to their depositions.***

2.6 The following Graph 2.1 shows the incidence of murders known to the Police in Belize between 1999 and 2007 and other policing correlates of investigative efficiency.

Graph 2 .1 Incidence of Murders/ Efficiency Indices



*Source: JICC

N.B. There is a time lag between arrests, trials and convictions for any year so the correlates should be understood with that in mind.


2.7 Declines in arrests, prosecution and convictions for murders are associated with increases in murders. While this is a function of the entire Criminal Justice System it is also a sign of overload and increasing ineffectiveness of criminal investigations and supporting intelligence and analytical processes.

2.8 The overall average conviction rate for 1999 to 2007 is 1 conviction to 10 murders. Allowing for a time lag of 12 months between the reported 92 murders in 2006 and the 2 convictions in 2007 reveals a ratio of 1 conviction to every 46 murders reported. Using the number of convictions for any year while allowing for a 1 or 2 year time lag between reports and convictions, shows only a slight improvement in these ratios. THIS IS AN INTOLERABLE SITUATION.

2.9 Annually between 45% to 50% of all murders are committed in Belize City. Map 2.1 below shows the concentration of randomly selected murders for different periods over the last 4 years for murders in Belize City. The table shows the extremely close proximity between the murder scene and the residence of the victims and murderers. This density makes situational Police interventions, Intelligence Led Policing, CBP and other social programmes potentially more effective.

2.10 The creation of low single income human settlements in cities have led to concentrated criminality all over the democratic world, so plans afoot to provide housing for the “poorest of the poor” should include building in the concept of defensible space; mixed income occupation with community and self policing structures.

Map 2.1 Locations-Murder/ Victim/ Offenders – Belize City



2.11 Besides poor investigative methods, processes and an inadequate legal regime, other important factors associated with declining convictions for murders is a prosecution service unequal to the task of matching better trained and experienced attorneys – at – law in court. Long delays before trial also present many problems for the prosecution as well as poor communication between police file readers, investigators and prosecutors.

2. It is recommended that

- The GoB begin to create a prosecution service staffed with more prosecutors who are attorneys- at –law and take steps to reduce the backlog of criminal cases.***
- The Department of Public Prosecution (DPP) develops protocols to guide cooperation between prosecutors and the police. There is evidence of sour relations in some districts.***
- The GoB Legislate for a LOWER COURT PRESIDED OVER BY A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE TO TRY PETTY SUMMARY JURISDICTION OFFENCES AT NIGHTS.***


DETERRENCE

2.12 From a policing perspective the reduction of murders is achieved through deterrence or prevention. Special deterrence is achieved when an offender is imprisoned or legally executed. General deterrence is achieved by successful socialization or fear of the high risks of getting caught and punished.

2.13 In Belize City, where about half of all murders have been committed annually over the last five years, the criminal fraternity is well able to estimate the risk of imprisonment for murders or other serious crimes since they know many of those offenders who have escaped justice for one reason or another. They also know how effective the use of fear and intimidation is. In short, this dangerous cohort is becoming less deterred by police action as the punishment of murderers decline.

2.14 The following graph shows comparisons of the murder rates among some Caribbean countries.

Graph 2.2 **Comparative Murder Rate**



* Source: Rudiments in Violence Studies. (NCFC Belize 2008)

INVESTIGATIONS AND DATA QUALITY

2.15 The data inputs into the NCIB from other government agencies such as Immigration, Customs, Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), etc are negligible along with low quality intelligence flow from Criminal Intelligence Unit (CIU). This narrow base can hardly support analysis for intelligence led policing sufficient to be converted into effective police action or investigative support.

2.16 Additionally, detectives tend to co-opt the little intelligence available, for crime investigations thus reducing the intelligence process solely to ex post facto evidence gathering. This has sidelined intelligence which can indicate crime trends and patterns, data on community profiles, community attitudes and broad environmental and group scanning methods which should shape crime reduction strategies and investigative polices.

2.17 Overall, the organization of criminal investigation is characterized by

- Weak transnational extension of the investigative and security agenda.
- Minimal proactive planning and analysis.
- Insufficient targeting of prolific offenders and organized criminal kingpins.
- Unduly heavy reliance on traditional and usually weak CHIS.
- The absence of a Crime Management Strategy and Intelligence Led Policing methods.
- Hoarding and secreting intelligence and CHIS by individual detectives for their career advantage.
- Exclusion of the Uniform Branch (55% of sworn staff) from routine assistance and intelligence/ data gathering.
- Little or no organized undercover penetration.
- Insufficient funding and MANAGEMENT of CHIS.
- Little inter-agency or intra-departmental coordination.
- Inadequate oversight of investigation and inept case preparation.
- No systemized and continuous on-the-job detective training.
- Lack of basic transportation.
- An obsolete and totally fragmented and paper based crime statistical gathering and storage system.
- An inadequate legal regime for crime control.

SUMMARY JURISDICTION OFFENCES

2.18 Too many REPORTED SUMMARY JURISDICTION offences remain uninvestigated. Only in exceptional cases should detectives investigate these, while uniformed members on shift duty cannot be expected to do this on their time.

3. It is therefore recommended that a select number of uniformed staff be identified to undertake the investigation of most of these offences. This is a good training ground for future detectives.

VIOLENCE, DRUG TRAFFICKING, MURDERS

2.19 The dynamics and explanations for the high incidence of murders are related to the factors associated with increasing urban/ societal violence. Drug trafficking makes more guns available and provide an alternative illegitimate economic structure in place of failed/ failing legitimate means for young males to earn a living and retain their dignity and self esteem. Guns command respect and provide these. It is used to defend, attack and make a living among the violence prone foot soldiers of the criminal fraternity. But there remains the relatively impenetrated and undetected socio-economic strata which provides the finance and organization for drug trafficking and organized crime.

2.20 Factors now fueling increases in the murder rate are gang related, multiple murders and reprisals among the estimated 900 documented gang members. (Conscious Youth Development Programme [CYDP] estimates).

2.21 As more offenders/ victims/ weapons enter conflicts, old grudges and more human targets expand the dynamics. This includes collateral targets such as friends and family members, leading to multiple murders and recycled reprisals. Left unchecked the next evolutionary stages are urban inter-community conflicts supported by growing contra-cultural norms and an emerging criminal economy based on “increasing extortion” (Summary Report on Gang Violence. NCFC 2008) increasing narcotic trade and consumption; greater links with transportation, small business hustlers and street trading along with more attempts to penetrate the machinery of the main political parties vending fear as a political tool. At that stage violence/ murders becomes exponentially more difficult and costly to control.

2.22 The GoB should note embryonic forms of criminogenic conditions coalescing in other District towns and intervene early with programmes led by Citizen Coalition Committees.

2.23 Underlying all this however are dysfunctional patterns of male socialization, fractured families and too few socially approved opportunity structures. This is generating mass deprivation and exclusion in a toxic urban setting in the Southside of Belize City where

more than 2 of 3 youths live below the poverty line. (The National figure is 33.9%. Poverty Assessment Report GoB 2002).

2.24 As currently organized neither CBP, CYDP, Youth for the Future (YFF), the Yarborough Project nor policing action will more than marginally and temporarily reduce youthful urban violence and the murder rate if they are not more integrated with a massive focused, effective and well financed project of urban renewal and rehabilitation. Caribbean studies have shown that this must be designed for youth inclusion and empowerment with viable alternative sources of income and dignity aimed at halting social exclusion and DEMEANING ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP. It also seems clear that nation-wide programmes of amelioration and socio-economic development at the MACRO LEVEL will have little short or medium term impact on violence in Southside.

2.25 The more focused programmes mentioned above should include a group of volunteer graduate/ post graduate students under professional guidance to gather data for a better understanding of some specific but locally generated factors associated with violence and the murder rate in the Southside. As time and effort are of the essence this should coincide with a MASSIVE BIPARTISAN/ PUBLIC/ PRIVATE sector partnership supported by international financing to strengthen focused soci-economic interventions. The Government's 360 degree approach will have to be integrated with the crime reduction plans of the Crime Control Council, along with prioritized action plans, timelines and budgets. NGO's and a volunteer corps would also have to be galvanized. BELIZEANS CAN DO IT BUT THE GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION MUST COOPERATE AND LEAD.

TARGETING ORGANIZED CRIME KINGPINS

2.26 There is a Major Crime Investigation Unit which is part of the NCIB. Its efforts remain primarily reactive. There is very little collaboration with the FIU and none with the Commissioner of Income Tax nor the Head of the National Land Registry. The NCIB does not maintain a Surveillance Unit.

2.27 As a consequence they cannot use the tax laws, questionable bank transactions and property ownership along with persistent surveillance to prosecute and imprison organized criminal kingpins.

4. It is recommended that a meeting of the heads of these departments be convened and collaborative mechanisms be developed to redirect the activities of the Major Crimes Unit away from reactive investigators of known crimes towards using intelligence led policing methods allied with the tax and assets seizure laws to target organized and wealthy criminals who have laundered their way into respectability.

5. It is recommended that one of the overseas officers recommended to assist with the transformation of the BPD assist the AIDT to completely REORGANIZE THE NCIB. In the meantime it is recommended that;

- An Unsolved Murder Investigating Team REOPENS CERTAIN UNSOLVED and nolle prosequi murder cases.*
- IDENTIFICATION PARADES BE COMPUTERIZED with photo albums for line ups. This has passed the test of Judicial acceptability in other Caribbean Countries.*

- Detective Inspectors and ranks above be appointed TRAVELLING OFFICERS and be paid an allowance for the use of their cars on duty and for mileage done. Increased mobility is vital.*
- The funding for CHIS be increased and managed. (See relevant rules in SB report)*
- Information and Communication Technology recommended for The National Intelligence Branch to be shared with NCIB.*

- *Organized undercover penetration by Deep Covert Agents (DCA's) be undertaken after standard operational procedures are approved and a budget provided.*
- *Mechanisms be developed to integrate all aspects of intelligence led policing in criminal investigations and among the uniformed operational members of the BPD.*

2.28 Some ten months ago the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (BATFE) offered for agreement, a memorandum of Understanding giving the BPD the E trace software and access to the BATFE internet based firearm tracing data. This important offer has not yet been operationalized.

CONCLUSION

2.29 The AIDT SHOULD REORGANIZE the NCIB to;

- *Strengthen its investigative structure and capacities.*
- *Enable closer integration with SB and all uniformed officers and Units.*
- *Utilize the same intelligence data base within the Intelligence Branch.*
- *Improve its investigative procedures around INTELLIGENCE LED and PROBLEM ORIENTED POLICING.*

- *Work more closely with CYDP, and YFF and Community Based Police Officers.*
- *Improve its statistical gathering methods.*
- *Create mechanism for the better management of investigations, follow through and training.*

- *Disseminate improved crime control data, interdiction and other information relating to crime and criminals via a fortnightly CRIMINAL GAZETTE.*
- *Create a Crime Management and Major Inquiry Team of experienced investigators.*

- *Establish closer working links with the FIU and Customs and Excise and Income Tax Departments, Belize Agricultural and Health Authority (BAHA), Border Control etc.*
- *Accelerate the introduction of the CIMS into all activities of the Branch.*
- *Sign on and begin to use the BATFE firearm E trace software to trace recovered firearms not traceable to licensed holders in Belize.*

Chapter 3

Terms of Reference:

Review All Aspects of the Management, Command, Control and Supervision of the Belize Police Department and Make Recommendations

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

3.1 The strategic objectives of the BPD are enumerated in the policing plan for 2006-10 along with supporting action plans. These remain essentially the same as the previous plan for 2000-05, except that two additional strategic objectives with action plans have been added to the later plan for 2006-10. The earlier strategic objectives are to improve investigative and crime preventative capabilities and general service delivery; to target organized crime, drug trafficking and to reduce traffic accidents. The second plan (2007-10) includes the improvement of police welfare and the promotion of “Community Policing”. Of the 28 targets set for 2000-05 only five were measured and met.

3.2 Common to both policing plans, are few attempts to measure inputs, outputs, outcomes and IMPACT. There was no benchmarking. There are 68 targets in the 2006-10 plans which are also characterized by lack of measurements. Throughout both plans, failed targets are merely repeated and “papered over” with ambiguous language. In some cases deliverables were entirely dependent on expected budgetary approval which was not forthcoming, or decisions by other agencies which were not made.

3.3 To underscore the lack of commitment to CBP this activity was not mentioned in the 2000-05 policing plan.

3.4 Beside the usual crime reduction plans, there was little consideration about what the public expect of the Police Department and more so, what they expect of their local police. Target setting with too many failed objectives are a common feature of these plans and it is evident that staff has not been held accountable for repeated failures.

MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP

3.5 The management and leadership of the BPD focus upon command and general administration which are effective in the context and range of current practices and past demands. The senior leadership is respected and generally regarded by members as people of integrity. This view is now being slowly undermined by creeping corruption and questionable promotion practices.

3.6 The imperatives of a paper based, rule bound, command culture of senior ranks are emphasized and consume almost as much, if not more time and energies as those devoted to broader organizational objectives. The ensuing internal instability sustains the values of the command style of management and continued ineffective attempts at control. This has diverted the attention of senior ranks from managing the difficult task of cascading strategies and ensuring service delivery relating to the prevention, control and investigations of crime. Correspondingly those who adapt well to the command culture, already described will naturally advance over those who emphasize organizational effectiveness. The findings presented throughout this report support this assessment.

3.7 Despite this, there is a prevailing convivial management environment despite a tall hierarchy of ranks. The Commissioner of Police (CoP) chairs a monthly meeting with a senior policy group consisting of the Deputy Commissioner (DCP) Management Services, The ACP Operations, ACP Eastern Division and The Head of National Crime Investigations and select invitees.

3.8 Over the past 12 years, some Senior Officers sent on courses have introduced the policing literature of modernization leading to a plethora of policies, strategic protocols, action plans and orders pertaining to many aspects of policing. Monthly strategic review meetings are chaired by the CoP where targets are reviewed. Many are not met because they are either not measured or measurable and members are not held accountable. These meetings are more rituals than substance.

ROLE OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL SECURITY

3.9 Another obvious and important reason for this state of affairs is that there are insufficient mechanisms enabling the Cabinet and Assembly to create a clear performance framework and Strategic Targets for the BPD. The Ministry of National Security should be exercising greater control over public safety policies and holding the CoP accountable. This not being the case, there is a wide gap between the police rhetoric of modernization and real deliverables.

6. In keeping with The Constitutional responsibility of the Cabinet for ensuring public safety it is recommended that a National Policing Policy and Standards Board be established within the Ministry of National Security. Its mandate would be to;

- Formulate specific National Policing Performance Framework by which the CoP is held accountable.*
- Advise the CEO on the development of a National Security Policy Architecture.*
- Identify key issues and priorities concerning all policy matters relating to law enforcement.*
- Provide expert strategic advice, papers, briefings and support to the CEO and Minister.*
- Advise and act as liaison on any matter the CEO or Minister may require.*

7. A critical challenge, is that to embed the policies and practices of modern and more effective policing in the BPD will require leaders who will not only carry on with general aspects of transactional management but who are also TRANSFORMATIONAL, i.e, leaders who will inspire, facilitate, empower, and stir ALL members to look beyond their own self interest for the good of the department within the framework of a more ethical, challenging and stimulating policing environment.

LAY OVERSIGHT

3.10 There are neither ministerial mechanisms nor other provisions to hold the management of the BPD accountable through democratized, civilian / lay oversight and inspection of policing policy and performance.

8. So it is recommended that a POLICE INSPECTORATE BOARD be created and staffed by sectorial and community groups, The Auditor General and an Inspector General. This responsibility could either be added by legal amendment to the Crime Control Council or be located in the Ministry of National Security (MNS) and chaired by the CEO. The latter method is preferred. The Policing Policy and Standards mandate at para 6 above could be merged for economy.

3.11 Their mandate should be to inspect and monitor;

- Policy implementation, strategic direction, leadership, management effectiveness and service delivery in the BPD.
- Performance standards and best practices
- The use of material and financial resource (supporting other audits)
- The effectiveness of Human Resource Development (HRD) and to
- Conduct thematic inspections and enquire into any matter required by the responsible Minister or CEO.

Provision should be made to table these reports in the Assembly.

3.12 This approach would serve the dual purpose of citizen participation and to provide a mechanism by which the government fulfils its primary responsibility for public safety and security of the nation. The CoP should not be expected to report on the effectiveness of his leadership and management.

EDUCATION FOR THE POLICE

3.13 The Senior Officers of the BPD must understand broad social and economic issues, and the social and individual psychology of citizens. They must be exposed to an introduction to the history and sociology of Belize; the demographic and developmental issues of the nation and be well grounded in government, and criminal and human rights law; in project, police management and strategic management; criminal justice, community development and leadership. Modern policing in a democracy needs educated Police Officers who are able to link policing objectives with those of democratic governance and national development. Police Officers who can recognize the complex connections between crime and other social problems; who can manage change, challenge and complexity at an accelerating pace in a globalized environment.

9. It is recommended that the pivotal ranks where these precise demands of leadership, management and education should be met are at the level of formation/ District Commanders and ranks above.

10. It is also recommended that this approach should begin in introductory modules in recruit training and internship along with legal and procedural topics and be graded upwards through in-service training and finally at the superintending ranks where relevant baccalaureates should be a prerequisite.

11. In this regard, it is recommended that the University of Belize (UB) be asked to assist in developing the introductory, intermediate and advanced readings for individual learning and personal development.

This will also serve to close these gaps in overseas courses. This is not a pie in the sky as police recruits in Belize display high levels of intelligence, and the capacity to advance their learning. The public often look to constables for leadership in difficult situations in the field.

12. It is recommended that to achieve this and other structured and timely transformation of the BPD, a concerted effort be made by an AIDT which would report to the CoP and CEO, MNS to help operationalize reformulated policies and strategies to drive a reconstructed agenda of change. This is not dissimilar to any modern public sector reform programme among the Caribbean Nations. The details of this direction are enumerated throughout this report.

13 It is recommended that this new direction should be integrated into the performance management of a Transformed RE-VITALIZED AND ETHIC BASED PERFORMANCE POLICE CULTURE.

OUTREACH PROGRAMMES

3.14 Many admirable Police outreach programmes exist and a few are being expanded. They need however to also target other groups such as the elderly and the physically and mentally challenged so as to fit crime reduction programmes within a broader humanitarian ideal.

14. It is recommended that the CYDP should be quickly expanded since Transnational studies have shown that young people at high risk for crime can be diverted by attractively structured activities and opportunities.

3.15 Outreach programmes developed by the BPD are a credit to the organization and could serve as a model for other Caribbean Police Forces.

MANAGEMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCE

3.16 Nowhere in the BPD is there more evidence of ineffective policies, weak management oversight, practices and procedures than in the areas of performance management and development of its human resources.

3.17 There is little semblance of effective systems of performance measurements and standards. Key Performance Indicators (KPI) are not created, bench marked, applied to individuals, nor critical policing tasks. Few outputs and people expected outcomes are measured or evaluated. The training needs of Senior Officers sometimes identified by appraisals are not fulfilled due to the lower cost of various highly differentiated Senior Officers courses available through technical assistance programmes. These have overshadowed the critical police management courses for Senior Officers available in Canada, the UK and some countries in the Caribbean.

PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND EVALUATION

3.18 The appraisal system used in the BPD was designed by the Office of Governance in The Belize Public Service. It requires that performance standards measure, among other criteria, quantity, quality, timeliness of individual performance and punctuality. These targets, among others must be agreed upon and clearly stated, achievable, measurable, specific and be in writing. This requires formalized tracking mechanisms which do not exist except in cases where conduct stands out one way or other triggering written reports which will be considered in appraisals. But the system was not designed to work in such a haphazard way. Another serious shortcoming is that the BPD completes only one of the two appraisal cycles thus undermining overall effectiveness.

3.19 One appraisal form is designed to apply to all ranks from Inspector to DCP, while a second form is designed to evaluate all ranks from Constables to Sergeants.

15. Due to the marked differences in responsibilities *it is recommended that KPIs be differentiated and applied to each rank and individual. "Appraisals of members are subjective as commissioners change from one system to another.* The department has fallen down in the basics". (Quote from the DCP responsible for Management Services in interview on 23/7/08 at 10:15 a.m.)

3.20 Routine record keeping and the clerical functions of the department are well administered, but every other aspect of Human Resources Management and Development is out of step with the demands of a modern Police Department. There is a “Hardening of the Hierarchies” in a management culture where, with too few exceptions, low levels of performance and accountability have become the norm.

16. It is recommended that;

- A HRD Strategy with supporting policies, technologies and operational procedures be designed and implemented by the AIDT.***
- All Non-Commissioned ranks enter into performance based renewable contracts of employment for five years. (Legal action required).***

- All commissioned ranks and senior civilian be similarly contracted but for four years.***
- A qualified civilian be appointed to manage the Human Resources and Development function of the BPD.***

- Performance measurements and KPI are developed for each rank/ post/ task/ unit and critical activity in the BPD along with recorded and measured outputs, outcomes and impact which citizens expect.***
- These have clear links with annual plans and strategic objectives.***

- Specific policing activity such as investigation, patrols etc are benchmarked and achievements and failures published annually.***
- That community/ sectorial consultation help shape police performance measurement and overall service delivery, since what gets measured powerfully shapes what gets prioritized and done.***

- Modern diagnostic tools are used along with extended interviews and predetermined academic qualification be instituted for all ranks including written exams up to rank of Inspectors.***
- Tracking mechanisms be developed to transmit measured performance which are critical to policing for consent.***

The proposed Draft Conditions of Service Regulations should provide the legal basis for many of the above recommendations.

INSPECTIONS

3.21 The entire department has not been formally inspected by any Senior Officer for 4 years and the Ministry has no mechanism to inspect Police management and standards. This is most unsatisfactory and is one of the many roots of various **MANAGEMENT** deficiencies which have become all too prevalent.

3.22 Since 2004 no report has been made on the deliverables from annual policing strategies, action plans and targets.

17. It is recommended that;

- ***The Commissioner conducts an annual inspection of the BPD along with periodic unannounced visits to formations, Districts and Units.***
 - ***The CoP forwards these reports to the MNS along with his comments.***
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- ***A Superintendent who should report directly to the Commissioner conducts announced inspections of various departments with a rotating 3 officer team twice yearly and provides written reports for the CoP.***
 - ***That this officer conducts thematic inspection and unannounced audits as directed by the CoP.***
 - ***Annual Achievement reports be prepared and published.***

PROMOTION

3.23 The poor state of performance management and evaluation of individual members has inculcated widespread loss of confidence in the quality of the process and decisions to promote members. The situation is best described by the CoP himself in a report to the Minister of National Security dated 31st March 2008 where he said

“In the same light, to address the PROBLEM OF MORALE of the Department. [We] will put into effect a FAIR and free promotion policy where officers below the rank of Inspector will be required to sit a written examination. Officers from the rank of Inspectors and above will be eligible for promotion based on stipulated requirements. This will ELIMINATE any incidents of perceived bias and enhance competition among officers.”

3.24 However, FIVE YEARS earlier, Sec 4 of Promotion Board Rules (Cap 138) enacted under the authority of Sector 7 of the Police Act states that “No Officer shall be eligible for promotion to any such rank” [i.e up to the rank of Sergeant] “unless he has PASSED THE WRITTEN POLICE QUALIFYING EXAMINATION TO BE SET AND MARKED BY THE COMMISSIONER or other Officer appointed by him” Of even greater concern is the fact that the Promotion Board mandated by these regulations is clearly ILLEGALLY CONSTITUTED.

3.25 The regulation requires that “The Promotion Board WILL consist of the Chairman and one member of the Security Services Commission and TWO Police Officers (to be appointed by the Commissioner) of the rank of Inspector or above”. It also requires that the “chairman of the Security Services Commission **SHALL** be the chairman of the Promotion Board and SHALL have an original and Casting Vote”.

3.26 Contrary to these requirements which appear to be mandatory, the Police Promotion Board has been constituted by one DCP who is CHAIRPERSON, three other Police Officers and the chairman of the Security Services Commission.

3.27 It is suggested that since the power to make appointments to senior ranks of the BPD has not been delegated by the Security Services Commission to the CoP, the STIPULATED REQUIREMENTS for their promotion which he mentions are exclusively the purview of that authority and that the recommendation of the CoP should be ONLY ONE OF THE MANY PROMULGATED CRITERIA. Currently this is not the case and the proposed draft conditions of Services Regulation 2008 only require that ‘The educational or professional qualification and other requirement for appointment to permanent post in the

Police Department shall be determined by the Commission after consultation with the Commissioner.” This should be revisited.

3.28 Section 10 (1) of The Police Rules enacted under the authority of section 7 of The Police Act Cap 138 also allows the Commissioner to promote ranks up to the rank of Sergeant without having to pass the stipulated written exams. However, this is only permitted if the members “possess special qualifications or marked abilities, or exceptional aptitude for special work”.

3.29 Rather than being the special exception, promotion without written examination has become the norm since ONLY THREE written qualifying exams for promotion were conducted over the past EIGHT years. For well over 90% of the members who did not sit the exams and who were promoted during 2007, there was nothing in their personal records to justify the promotions under the exception permitted at Sec 10 (1).

3.30 With respect to the promotion of senior ranks, the record of some do justify the accelerated pace of promotion while the records of others cannot. Some qualified members have also been left “marking time”.

3.31 With an illegally constituted Promotion Board, which tilts the balance of power decidedly in favour of Senior BPD Officers and against the chairman and member of the Security Services Commission; with the absence of routine written exams for lower ranks; with subjectively dominated performance evaluation of all ranks, there is no doubt that these capricious decisions have lowered morale and the confidence of members in those Senior Staff engaged in these questionable decisions. This has had a profound effect on lowering professional standards, personal commitment and loyalty to the organization while degrading the available human potential.

18. It is recommended that;

- *The Draft Conditions of Services Regulation enumerate all criteria considered for appointment to the Senior Ranks.*
- *Promotions are based upon fair equitable, transparent and effective performance evaluations.*
- *The Police Rules governing promotion be complied with.*

SUCCESSION PLANNING

3.32 There are 79 Senior Police Officers in the BPD. The attrition among selected ranks are as follows.

- **From Superintendents to Commissioner**

By 2012, seven (7) or 29% of these ranks will have departed the department.

- **From Acting Inspectors to Assistant Superintendents**

By 2012, six (6) or 11% of these ranks will have departed the department.

19. In view of this, it is recommended that succession planning, career path and improved performance evaluation of the Senior Officer Corps along with a needs based officer training programme and an estimated budget be implemented by March 2009.

The following table 3.1 shows current staff ratios in the BPD.

GENDER, CIVILIANIZATION AND STAFF RATIOS

Table 3.1 **STAFF RATIOS**

SELECTED STAFF	TOTAL	Categories	RATIOS
Strength of BPD to date	1139	Police including Paid Sp. Cons: population 314,300	1:263
Total Civilian Staff	151	Ratio of Civ. Staff to Police	1:8
Total Women Police	128	Ratio of Women Police to Men	1:9
Total Volunteer Special Constables	30	Ratio of Vol. Sp. Cons to Police	1:38
Total Paid Special Constables	54	Ratio of Paid Sp. Cons to Police	1:21

3.33 Too many clerical/ administrative/ ancillary duties are performed by trained Police Officers. The cost of assigning trained Police Officers to these tasks is a drain on the public purse since they can be performed by qualified civilian personnel and special constables with greater economies.

20. It is recommended that over the next 3 years annual targets be set to reach the following ratios.

- Female to Male Police Officers 1:5***
- Civilian to Police Staff 1:4***
- Volunteer Special Constable Corps to Police Staff 1:1.5***
- Paid Special Constables to Police Staff 1:5***

3.34 This would contribute to a considerable increase in Police Staff available for CORE POLICE TASKS. This approach should lead to a downward revision of the proposed increase in police establishment by 3000 members in 2014. (See The Commissioner's Proposed Strategy to Address Serious Crimes 2/10/07). Gender issues are further discussed in Cap 4. These are all cost saving measures.

SUPERVISION

3.35 The quality of overall supervision of front line police in the field is mixed. The Specialist Units such as the Anti Drug (ADU) and Special Patrol Units (SPU), Domestic Violence Unit, Planning Inspection and Training Unit and a few others are fairly well supervised. Supervision of the regular uniformed Patrol Units and reception areas by Corporals is poor. As is to be expected, differences in the quality of oversight activities of the Senior Officer Corps vary from poor to good. Recommended reform of the organization structure at figure 3.4 will allow for greater delegation of routine internal administrative function, thus creating more time for the managerial ranks to attend to matters having a greater impact on results, service delivery and ensuring public trust.

21. It is recommended that an intensive in-service 80 hours modular supervisory course be designed for Sergeants and those remaining Corporals and that by 2010 attendance be one of the prerequisite for promotion to those ranks. Improved performance management, enforced promotion criteria, relevant training and meaningful oversight by Senior Management staff will all serve to invigorate the middle managers of the BPD.

INTERNAL COMMUNICATION

3.36 Internal Communication between members of The BPD is governed by the principles of seniority in rank. Most written orders emanate from the CoP via Standing Orders. Within the senior ranks, written and verbal communication is more collegial, whereas from among them to the NCO's it is always strongly directive and sometimes unclear. Direct written communication from senior ranks to constables is rare as it has to pass through the responsible NCO's. Distributing copies of written orders or memoranda at this level on the need to know basis is rare.

3.37 This historically rooted and inhibiting embedded Top down, order centered style has discouraged the lateral or upward flow of ANY MEANS of communicating observations, ideas or opinions and is regarded by many lower ranks as downright dangerous for career advancement.

3.38 This method of communication, signals that status and police knowledge are purely rank and rarely ever ROLE BASED. To signal otherwise is to question the authority of the senior rank communicated to and is often regarded as out of place despite observing the required rituals of deference.

3.39 This slavish dependence on orders and a tall hierarchy of ranks have stifled initiative and discouraged delegation of authority to act. Little gets fixed from below and solicitation of ideas and suggestions from BELOW is a sign of weakness and ignorance ABOVE. These problems exist in most organizations but in the BPD they have had a PATHOLOGICAL EFFECT ON THE ORGANIZATION in shaping mass exclusion of the

largest part of the cognitive resource of bright but junior staff in the policing endeavour. SO LITTLE GETS DONE RIGHT THE FIRST TIME.

3.40 Policing requires written rules but the language and style should be more collegial. For this to happen it requires organization-wide transformation which will generate greater TRUST in each other across all ranks. This will evolve with improved training, socialization and commitment to ethical values and courteous behaviour to all, regardless of rank in the department or CITIZENS' STATION IN LIFE who remains at the receiving end of police culture.

CONSTABLES QUALITY CIRCLES

22. It is recommended that each District establish Constables Quality Circles consisting of all constables with a chairman who should provide the CoP with quarterly reports for improvements and to convene a bi-annual conference of Constables chaired by the CoP to review developmental issues and policing practices.

POLICE CULTURE

3.41 The literature describes police culture as a storehouse of transmitted, shared and taken for granted assumptions, understandings, attitudes and values arising from a sense of mission and action oriented behaviour emphasising danger, suspicion, solidarity, collective isolation and authority. Many of these essential features of police culture in the BPD have not fully coalesced due probably to low levels of violence against members and how well integrated they are into their communities, not being a barracked organization.

3.42 Many recommendations throughout this review will help change the dysfunctional aspects of police culture. These include inspirational leadership and change; embedding service, ethics and inner directedness; lateral entry schemes, job enrichment and fair and equitable promotion practices; training and new compliance systems with control over field


practices etc. These offer significant possibilities for positive cultural transformation provided the WILL, NEED and CLIMATE for changes are present.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE ORGANIZATION

3.43 There are many needs, roles and functions which help shape the structure of the department. Some are characteristic of most police departments while others are determined by national circumstances. Well designed, they help promote efficiency. Below is the organizational chart of the BPD which is now a constraint on the department's capacity to cope effectively with present policing demands. The current form of the organization is shaped by past functions but a new form is required to follow new functions.

PRESENT ORGANIZATION OF THE BELIZE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Figure 3.1



3.44 In the present structure the DCP is responsible for Management Services and NOT RESPONSIBLE as a True Deputy CEO of the Department, since the ACP responsible for Operations reports directly to the CoP.

“The DCP does not have an overall picture of what's happening in the department and is often ignorant of major events and processes in the operations portfolio”. (Interview with the DCP at 10:35 am 23/7/08).

The experience, competencies and salary of a DCP are not fully utilized while managing the Management Services of the department.

23. So it is recommended that;

- ***All Assistant Commissioners report to one DCP and***
- ***One ACP be appointed to the Management Services Portfolio instead of a DCP.***

3.45 Once this DCP relieves the CoP from everyday coordination and provides oversight and routine direction to the various portfolios, this will enable the CoP to manage at The Strategic and Policy Level, protect and project policing interest nationally; lead, inspire and motivate police staff; network with national power brokers, intellectual, faith based and community leaders along with regional and international policing figures and organizations.


3.46 Presently one ACP is responsible for Uniform Operations and The NCIB which includes Special Branch. In view of ever emerging threats to the security of the nation, both the investigative and intelligence branches require the devoted leadership and strategic competencies and management experiences which an ACP is expected to have.

24. So it is recommended that an ACP heads the Criminal Investigation portfolio, another heads a new National Intelligence Branch while an ACP continue to head Uniform Operations. Belize District would continue to be headed by an ACP. These changes along with delayering of the ranks of SSP and Corporals would LOWER COST by more than BZ \$4.0 M PER ANNUM.

With the exception of some minor adjustments concerning intelligence and depending on some suggested options to be decided upon, the following structure at figure 3.2 with 1 DCP FUNCTIONING AS SUCH and 5 ACP's is recommended.

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE OF THE BELIZE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Figure 3.2




CURRENT AND RECOMMENDED ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE OF A DISTRICT

3.47 The following is a typical organization structure of a District excluding Belize District.

CURRENT ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE OF A DISTRICT

Figure 3.3



3.48 In the proposed district structure below the chain of command should be less vertical and the span of the control OF THE 2ND IN at figure 3.4 Command narrowed.


3.49 The District Commanding Officers would therefore have one Assistant Superintendent and one Inspector, each managing their portfolios of operations and management services. It is within any one of these two portfolios that ASP get their experience to eventually manage a district. This division of functions will allow the commanding officer the time to lead and interact with other major interest in the District, to strategize, plan, coordinate and to manage service delivery and community outreach. This officer spends too much time on everyday routine paperwork related to support and Management services. This reconfiguration will, with minor adjustments, logically follow the division of functions at the Police Headquarters.

3.50 The increase in the rank of 2nd in Command of a District from Inspector to ASP is to reflect planned adjustments to staff levels and new focus on managing and accountability in the District which should be seen as a **Basic Command Unit (BCU)** which should now be the CRITICAL SITE OF POLICE SERVICE DELIVERY. It is also an advantage to have an ASP who can be evaluated as they rotate in command whenever the Commanding Officer goes on leave.

3.51 Below is the recommended structure of a typical District excluding the Belize District.

Figure 3.4

RECOMMENDED ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE OF A DISTRICT



DELAYERING OF RANKS

3.52 There can be little if any justification for the ranks of SSP and Corporal in the BPD. Superintendents should manage Districts except for Belize District and grade II Constables and Sergeants should fill the supervisory gap left by de-layered Corporals. (See 3.53 below)

3.53 To “push” more senior ranks on the streets, the pivotal supervisory rank of 85 Sergeants should be increased by 30 and the rank of Corporal which amounts to 198 be abolished by attrition. Adding 6 more ASPs and 30 more Sergeants while abolishing SSPs and Corporals would save more than BZ \$4.0 M annually. (See recommendation 25)

3.54 The supervisory gap which remains after abolishing the rank of Corporals and adding only 30 Sergeants should be plugged by appointing grade II constables who are appraised and awaiting promotion to Sergeants. This cohort should attend a supervisory course and be placed on the maximum incremental scale for constables. Most will already be on that scale so this rearrangement will cost less and be more efficient.

25. It is recommended that;

1. Ranks of SSP and Corporals in the BPD be gradually de-layered by attrition to;

- a) Create a flatter organization structure.***
- b) Deliver better value for money.***
- c) Achieve more efficient delegation of authority.***
- d) Push more senior ranks closer to street duties.***

2. The first rank that should be abolished by attrition is that of SSP. This would leave the ranks of SP responsible for Districts and their second officers as Assistant Superintendents and Inspectors. This arrangement would include Belize District (which handles about 50% of all crimes with nearly 50% of the BPD staff) but would leave an ACP in command and SP with portfolios responsibilities. Inspectors would continue to manage support services and operational units in the BPD.

26. It is recommended that while this is taking place the rank of Corporal now at 198 (including acting Corporals) should be abolished by attrition while the rank of Sergeants be gradually expanded by 30.

- A cadre of qualified constables awaiting promotion be trained, placed at the maximum of their scale and be appointed Constables Grade 2.***

27. The SALARY STRUCTURE as distinguished from the rank structure be also flattened to a greater extent than is now the case by a stricter and more organized performance based awards of increments and higher allowances for relevant degrees and OTHER SPECIALIST POLICING QUALIFICATION.

3.55 These measures would also partially shift, reward and status from rank to role, making for greater professionalism, performance and more inclusive culture.

3.56 As the numbers of constables are increased, the ratio of 1 Sergeant to approximately 5 Constables should be maintained.

28. It is recommended that PROPOSED INCREASE TO 3000 MEMBERS BE PUT ON HOLD and a programme of civilianization and staff rationalization be undertaken. The planned increases of 80-120 Constables in October 2008 continue, bringing the strength to 860 constables. At that point there should be a careful REVIEW OF MANPOWER NEEDS by the AIDT.

3.57 The chart below shows the actual and recommended rank structure and ratios between ranks.

Figure 3.5 **Rank Pyramid and Ratios**




Table 3.2 **Recommended and Actual Ratios**

Strength of Each Rank	Recommended Ratios	Strength of each Rank	Actual Ratios
1 DCP to 5 ACP	1:5	1 DCP to 2 ACP	1:2
5 ACP to 14 SPs 155	1:3	2 ACP to 6 SPs	1:3
NIL SSP		6 Sr. Superintendents to 14 Superintendents	1:2
14 SPs to 22 ASPs	1:2	14 SPs to 16 ASPs	1:1
22 ASPs to 39 Inspectors	1:2	16 ASPs to 39 Inspectors	1:2
39 Inspectors to 155 Sergeants	1:4	39 Inspectors to 125 Sergeants	1:3
NIL Corporal		125 Sergeants to 198 Corporals	1:2
155 Sergeants and 100 Grade II Constables to 640 Constables	1:3	125 Sergeants to 740 constables	1:6
		198 Corporal to 740 Constables	1:4

* Decimal place rounded off.

NOUMENCLATURE

3.58 There is an illogical patchwork of designations at various levels of the police organization. These include the indiscriminate use of Branch, Division and Units. Examples are Internal Affairs Division (IAD) with 5 members, CIU with 17 members and the CIB with 96 members.

29. It is recommended that all activities headed by ACPs are designated as Branches. Except for Districts and formations, activities having national responsibility but managed by ranks lower than ACPs be designated as a Division while lower down the structure all others are designated as Units.

INCREASES TO STAFF COMPLEMENT

3.59 The issue of staff complement of the BPD is raised in Chapter 8 and other chapters of this report in so far as it affects civilianization, employment of Special Constables, rational deployment and gender ratios. The conventional wisdom is that the strength of the BPD needs to be increased to 3000 over another few years starting now. Budget has been committed for another intake of recruits which begins training in November 2008. THIS APPROACH IS NOT RECOMMENDED as there is endemic underutilization of staff, irrational deployment and great focus by the police on performing ancillary tasks which civilianization could redirect TO CORE POLICING TASKS. Evidence for this lies in the ratio of 1 police officer (excluding permanently paid Special Constables) to 273 persons nationally, which is among the best in the world.

30. It is therefore recommended that;

- After this recruit intake in November 2008, a programme of civilianization of ALL ANCILLARY POLICING task be undertaken aiming at a 1:4 ratio of civil staff thus redirecting the police to critical patrol, intelligence and community service functions after a 16 hour reorientation training.***
- More paid Special Constables be employed to eventually reach a ratio of 1:5 uniformed members.***


- *The volunteer corp of Special Constables be expanded to a ratio of 1:1.5 to uniformed staff and include members of various professions who can contribute to the mission of policing.*
- *Community Service Officers be recruited, trained, appointed Special Constables and assigned to villages, neighbourhoods and sectors in towns.*
- *A National Police Reserve consisting of 700 Special Constables be created with 100 for each district and 200 for the Belize District.*

* See Chapter 8 for more particulars on the above recommendations.

After these programmes are advanced, police manpower needs should be IMPARTIALLY EVALUATED by the AIDT.

3.60 The following Graph 3.1 provides an overview of police manpower distribution.

Graph 3.1 **Distribution and Functions- BPD**




3.61 The above table shows that 55% of BPD staff is deployed into patrol functions (including Traffic, ADU and SPU).

31. It is recommended that uniformed operational units/ staff should consist of not less than 75% of total BPD staff. Increased civilianization and ancillary policing which would allow this are discussed in Cap 8.


3.62 The following maps 3.1 and 3.2 shows the distribution of BPD staff and police stations and substations in each District along with police to population ratios and population densities.

Map 3.1



Map 3.2

Diagrammatic of the Belize Police Department Distribution & Ratios



COMMENTS ON MAPS 3.1 AND 3.2

- Given the population of Orange Walk and the Town along with its busy farming sector the police staff should be increased by 21 Police Officers.
- Placencia's population has significantly increased since the last census and is now a growing tourist resort area. The police staff at the station should be increased from 10 to 15 with 5 CSO's. (See Cap 8)
- Most of the other growing villages served by small 1 man police sub-stations should be additionally served by a number of Resident Community Service Officers who are appointed as Special Constables. Areas under special threats such as St. Margaret Village Station should continue with BDF support.
- The distribution of the police staff and stations nationwide are fairly evenly distributed considering population, commercial, industrial and tourism activities along with the incidence of crime, traffic accidents and other special threats.
- The deployment of **BDF** staff (not shown) compensates for some perceived deficiencies.

CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER THREE

3.63 The senior managers of the BPD focus on administration of traditional systems and processes and LESS ON MANAGING RESULTS; on command and less on CONTROL AND LEADERSHIP; on maintaining internal stability and less on CHANGE AND MANAGING THE ATTENDANT RISKS. These conclusions are supported by the evidence presented throughout this review. Nonetheless, even though lacking in experience, some commissioned officers of the department would be a credit to any modern police organization while others would find it difficult to adjust to an organizational environment of strict accountability, allied to a more demanding and results oriented performance culture.

32. It is recommended that the Security Services Commission be asked to identify this latter group and offer them an attractive voluntary early retirement proposal. This should pave the way to revitalize the Senior Officer Corps and leadership equal to the challenges of transforming and managing a modern and progressive Police Department more responsive to public expectations.

33. The younger officers with the capacity to manage a transformed department do not have the experience to implement reforms so it is recommended that the government negotiate to attach for one year one ACP from Barbados and one from South Africa to rotate between the portfolios of Management Services, Operations and CIB, prepare Belizean Officers to manage while assisting the AIDT which should be staffed by a police advisor and two local officers.

Chapter 4

Terms of Reference:

Review Recruitment, Training, Education and Development of Staff and Make Recommendations, (Human Resource and Development are dealt with in Cap 3)

RECRUIT TRAINING

4.1 The BPD maintains a police academy in the nation's capital city Belmopan. It can accommodate about 120 recruits in training during one intake. Police instructors are assigned to different classes throughout the duration of their training which culminates with a military passing out parade, after a basic course lasting for six months. The academy does not have a lecture theatre so the teaching methods cannot accommodate large classes for lecturers supported by Tutors. Instead two instructors are assigned to a class of about 20-25 students. These instructors specialize in various areas and sometimes teach other classes. All lecture notes are bound and given to each student at the beginning of the course.

4.2 The absence of a lecture theatre makes it difficult to accommodate specialist lecturers delivering to the entire student body.

4.3 At the head of the academy is a Commandant who reports to the Director of Training. The teaching method is primarily didactic with few teaching aids and fewer practical exercises. There is no individualized course work and great emphasis is placed on supervised group discipline. The environment is militarized and boot-camp-like.

POLICE INTERNSHIP

34. It is recommended that Recruit Training should be extended from 6 to 18 months. This can be done by reducing the initial syllabus period from 6 months to 4 months to improve efficiency and economy. After being introduced to criminal laws, police procedures and people skills, the applied aspects of policing can be better learned by doing. So it is recommended that a 14 months INTERNSHIP programme be designed for police interns to work under carefully selected tutor constables after graduation from the academy, during which they would engage in a programme of structured academic studies, operational experience and exams under the direction of a District Tutor Sergeant. He/ She would also be responsible for in-service training. On completion, each recruit would return to the academy for one week holistic assimilation and undergo an extended interview and assessment by a panel of senior officers appointed by the CoP.

These changes would;

- 1) Reduce initial training cost by BZ \$ 291,840.00 per 120 recruits.*
- 2) Make more police personnel available for operational duties at an earlier date*
- 3) Reduce the ever present influence of the tainted aspects of “cop culture” common to police departments world-wide.*
- 4) Provide a longer period of directed and integrated learning to socialize the recruit to absorb and practice professional policing and ethical behaviour in the work environment.*
- 5) Introduce certification supporting the development of professional standards.*
- 6) Offer leadership experience to Tutor Constables.*

This is the foundation where public trust and confidence is laid in a professional police department.

35. Following are some examples where it is recommended that the syllabus periods could be reduced. See more analysis of the syllabus content at pp 53-54.

- 1) Preparation for graduation should be reduced from 5 days to 3.***
- 2) In view of the tutor constable programme, the one week attachment to stations can be omitted.***
- 3) There are too many hours (35) devoted to study revision. The recruits should do revision in groups organized by themselves in their own time.***
- 4) The 37 hours devoted to teaching scenes of crimes should be reduced to 7 hours since this could be added at the beginning of internship.***

Many other such opportunities exist.

TRAINING METHODS

4.5 A bell is rung to signal the beginning of all training activities and events for the duration of the recruit's life at the academy. While this is necessary to stress the importance of punctuality at the beginning of training, its continued use after the first 2 weeks inhibits the development of self-discipline and personal responsibility at the expense of close over the shoulder control by training staff which continues to be the norm through training.

36. It is recommended that;

- The use of the bell be discontinued after 2 weeks and the boot camp regime be progressively relaxed in predetermined stages.***
- The basic recruit syllabus be divided into junior, intermediate and final stages reflecting the transition to greater acceptance of personal accountability and leadership roles under progressively less supervision.***

- *A training library be established with private sector assistance and that the recruit syllabus include a research and writing project on typical issues relating to crime, social problems and the community.*
- *This should count towards around 30% of the final written examination and should not await the establishment of the library as there is adequate material available at police stations, through interviews, the media and citizens.*
- *The term recruit be changed to student.*
- *A Police Student Body be formed for each intake.*

SYLLABUS CONTENT

4.6 The following table (3.1) highlights some dysfunctional aspects of the recruit syllabus which are self imposed obstacles in preparing police officers to successfully mediate and resolve everyday street conflict, and to apply the law with good judgement and discretion with regards for the rights of victims, offenders, the community and the state.

Analysis of Recruit Training Syllabus

Total Class room hours = 756 hours

Percentage of total syllabus by topic is as follows:

RECRUIT TRAINING SYLLABUS

Table 3.1

TOPIC	TOTAL HOURS	PERCENTAGES
Police Procedures	137	18.12%
Law	126	16.66%
Physical Exercise	87	11.50%
Orientation Topics	65	8.59%
Attachment (BZECTY)	42	5.55%
Scenes of Crime	37	4.89%
Study Revision	35	4.62%
Public Order	33	4.30%
Drill	32	4.23%
Graduation Preparation	32	4.23%
Exam/ Revision	30	3.96%
Test	22	2.91%
Road Run	15	1.98%
Inspection	15	1.98%
Fatigue	15	1.98%
Sports	12	1.58%
Human Dignity & Conflict Resolution	9	1.19%
Constitutional Rights	4	0.55%
Self Defense	3	0.40%
Sociology/ Psychology	3	0.40%
Crime Prevention	2	0.28%
Total	756	100%

LATENT vs. MANIFEST FUNCTIONS

4.7 The various challenges facing the BPD are underscored by another look at syllabus hours which reveals the latent as against the manifest approach to policing citizens.

COMPARISONS OF SOME RECRUIT TRAINING TOPICS

Table 3.2

No.	TOPIC	HOURS
	Orientation Topics	65
	Human Dignity & Conflict Resolution	9
	Study Revision	35
	Constitutional Rights	4
	Graduation Preparation	32
	Sociology/ Psychology	3

4.8 The police trainee ABSORBS MANY LESSONS NOT IN THE CURRICULUM. These lessons help shape their values, behaviour and approach to their new career in their formative years. Often what are not stressed in the syllabus and examinations help form these values as much as what are emphasized.

4.9 Both the recruit syllabus and a review of available exam papers and the 'question bank' of about 1600 questions reveal a sidelining of conflict resolution skills; neglect of the development of good judgement and discretion, knowledge of CBP and more unfortunately of ETHICAL behaviour and leadership. Not one question could be discovered which tested the recruits' judgement in diffusing street conflict or using appropriate force in difficult situations.

37. It is recommended that at least 10 hours each be devoted to;

- ***Conflict Resolution and the Use of Force***
- ***Constitutional and Human Rights***
- ***Sociology.***
- ***Crime Prevention***
- ***Ethics***
- ***Psychology***
- ***Community Based Policing***
- ***Belizean and Caribbean History***

38. It is also recommended that;

- ***A training needs analysis be conducted by the AIDT to inform a new syllabus for recruits and all other ranks.***
- ***At least 25% of the non-police aspects of syllabus hours be delivered by qualified and volunteer civilian lecturers at the academy. The current situation is organizationally incestuous.***
- ***A civilian with at least a Bachelors Degree majoring in the social/ behavioural sciences be appointed director of academic studies for recruit, internship, in-service, advanced training and general educational advancement and guidance of members who are studying or wish to further their education.***

In the short run a serving Police Officer with the requisite qualification should undertake this task along with other functions in areas such as planning and research.

CERTIFICATION OF FAILURES

4.10 About 12% of recruits fail their examinations. They are however graduated on the grounds of directives from “higher up” because of man power needs and the cost of training. Senior officers have verified this practice claiming that their recommendations to terminate are often overruled even when terminations are recommended due to serious cases of disciplinary breaches.

39. It is recommended that the Commandant’s recommendation to terminate recruits service should be overruled only in exceptional cases.

40. High exam failure rates can be due to many causes and it is recommended that the Ministry of Education assess teaching proficiency and the examinations, including recruits entrance examinations. It is recommended one re-sit of final exams be allowed for recruits who have passed exams in earlier stages of training.

4.11 Recruits examinations contain minimum standards which should be met so it is unacceptable in such circumstances to – without more- accept failures in the BPD. Short run savings will result in greater, long run costs.

HEALTHY LIFESTYLE AND WELLNESS

41. It is recommended that this subject should be included in the recruit and all training syllabi. Informative brochure on this subject should be posted at all stations throughout the academy and at police stations.

42. Training staff and all members undergo a comprehensive medical examination along with a standard physical fitness test every five years. Belize consists of large jungle areas where Police Officers can be expected to work. OBESITY among members should not be permitted.

REVIEW AND FEEDBACK

4.12 Little attempts are being made to seriously review the inputs, outputs and outcomes of the recruit training programme. On a visit to the Chief File reader who vets cases for the Courts, he said that a major challenge was the extremely poor writing of statements to support criminal charges. When questioned in the presence of the Head of the CIB for Belize City, it was revealed that this longstanding challenge was not communicated so that something could be done.

This is a recurring theme throughout the entire BPD.

TRAINING POLICY

4.13 In keeping with Governments' responsibility for public safety and national security policy, the Ministry of National Security (MNS) should exercise responsibility for designing all police training syllabus. This should be done by a National Policing Policy and Standards Unit (recommended at Cap 3). The current draft conditions of Service and Discipline Regulation 2008 proposes that the CoP be responsible for training policy. THIS IS NOT RECOMMENDED.

RECRUITING

4.14 The constant uncertainty as to when and how many recruits will be trained for any year has depleted the formerly large pool of waiting applicants and the consequent quality of recruits. The current AVERAGE ATTRITION RATE for 2002-07 is 7.3% (See Appendix 4), so it seems that the government could decide on the number of recruits to be trained each year in advance and allocate the necessary funds. The absence of such plans has prevented the development of a pool of suitable applicants leading to hasty selection (due to short notice to begin training) from a small pool of applicants.

43. It is recommended that an annual budget be provided for advertisements including visits to schools to market policing as a career. Recruiting and testing should be conducted for a four month period prior to the planned recruit intake so that a larger pool of qualified applicants is always available.

The recruit selection process must be revamped.

- It is recommended that in addition to current procedures, practical scenario exercises be designed to reveal the main attributes of individual character. The BDF could assist with this.***
- That written scenario exercises be used in extended interviews with a limited number of applicants (5-9) lasting for 4 hours.***
- A psychometric personality assessment screener should be developed with the help of the UB and used to help interviewers.***

4.15 These measures would help interviewers to reject that small number of frequently unsuitable applicants who would otherwise be selected.

4.16 The cost is usually recovered by a reduction in the costs of legal judgements and settlements for police wrongful actions. The broader advantage would be greater public trust in the police.

GENDER & RECRUITMENT

4.17 Breaching its promulgated equal opportunity policies, the BPD imposes limits on admission of females who are usually more qualified than male applicants. This has resulted in the gender ratio in the BPD of 1 female to 8 males i.e 13% of male police staff. Even by Caribbean standards this is low. Worse yet, many station Commanders visited were asking for more female officers who usually excel in many key areas of policing.

44. It is recommended that the BPD aim to close the gender gap to at least 20% of police staff over the next 3-4 years. That will be the tipping point where females can prove themselves equal to the most difficult operating conditions.

GRADUATE INTAKE

4.18 Rather than the intermittent recruiting of cadet police officers with undergraduate qualifications, the BPD should provide at least three vacancies for cadet officers with each recruit intake. They would undergo normal recruit training as is being done now, then enter a structured programme of practical police management for 12 months before going on to advanced studies. This would help efforts to raise professional standards while creating a fast track for highly qualified personnel.

EDUCATION

4.19 The educational standards of applicants to the BPD should be improved. The challenge is to transform the environment of the BPD to be a continuous learning organization. One solution is the recommendation at (p. 61) for a civilian/ Director of Academic Studies.

4.20 The cadet officer programme existing for some years now, has contributed to improving academic standards. Some officers have by their own efforts, improved their education while other are assisted by the government.

45. It is recommended that among other criteria, baccalaureates be required for advancement to the rank of Superintendent. Higher educational requirement should not be imposed on ranks below Assistant Superintendents, but it should be an important criterion for promotion to any rank.

4.21 The educational incentive programme Ref 113/1/2000 (6) which advances new and serving members over different incremental pay scales is ambiguous and excludes persons with baccalaureates and post graduate degrees.

46. It is recommended that these guidelines be amended to include persons with bachelors degrees and above and the rules be included in the Draft Condition of Service Regulations.

ACCELERATED PROMOTION

47. It is recommended that;

- An organized accelerated promotion programme should be available to all members of the BPD above 5 years service who display all the qualities of professional excellence, has a relevant baccalaureate and can pass a written examination.***
- Entry should be via application only and the criteria should be available to all members on joining.***
- Entry to the programme should be pegged at a very high level and be highly competitive. The UB and the Ministry of Education should be asked to assist in this regard.***

4.22 It is recognized that higher education is just one of many prerequisites of a good Police Officer. The placement and development of staff are addressed in (Cap 3 Human Resource Development).

ACADEMIC QUALIFICATION

4.23 With the exception of Senior Officers and Inspectors where approximately 25% have degrees ranging from Associate to Masters, the academic qualification of uniformed staff is below regional standards. Sixty eight (68) % of all constables are not educated beyond primary school level. The department is not marketing policing as an attractive career among high schools and tertiary institutions. (See recommendations above.)

48. It is recommended that a Director of Training and Education supported by a civilian Director of Academic Studies be appointed to manage all aspects of training and education and to develop supporting policies which will transform the BPD into a coherent and CONTINUOUS LEARNING ORGANIZATION.

OFFICER EXCHANGE PROGRAMME

4.24 There are many advantages that could accrue to Anglophone Caribbean states from a Police Officer Exchange Programme as each Police Department has their own unique strengths to offer each other.

49. It is recommended that the GoB lead the way through a project proposal to CARICOM for such an exchange programme.

A CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRAINING INSTITUTE

50. While somewhat outside the Terms of Reference, it is recommended that serious consideration should be given to convert The Police Academy into a Criminal Justice Training Institute offering training to Prison Courts, Immigration, Customs, Security Companies and other agencies (i.e security companies) at the ENTRY AND SUPERVISORY LEVELS. This would create economies of scale and an organization which can be MARKETED IN THE CARIBBEAN TO FINANCE ITSELF.

CONCLUSION

4.25 It is evident that the entire philosophy and the taken for granted assumptions which inform recruit training is out of step with the demands of a modern police department which require that lower ranks be more autonomous, self directed, accountable, self disciplined and customer oriented. They are also incongruent with the personal legal responsibility of a constable, at common law, for the consequences of his law enforcement actions. Obviously a major turnaround in how the human clay is molded to suit modern and more democratic forms of policing is urgently required.

51. It is recommended that the AIDT reform the Recruit In-Service training and Internship syllabi after a needs analysis.

Chapter 5

Terms of Reference:

To Review the Quality of Police Service Delivery, Ethical Behaviour and Discipline and Make Recommendations

INTRODUCTION

5.1 One of the six strategic objectives of the BPD is “to improve the overall quality of police service to the community with a view to securing more positive support and cooperation from the public in the fight against crime”. (Policing plan 2006-10) It is however certain that improving the quality of police service is an intrinsic public good with many more social benefits than an exchange for improved public cooperation.

5.2 In a broad sense, the delivery of police service involves all aspects of its operations directed towards enforcing the laws preserving public tranquility, protecting human rights and property, while maintaining order.

5.3 With this broad mandate policing has always been deeply implicated in nation building since it can either consolidate the legitimate power of the state or dissipate it to the point of creating division and social fractures. However, it is not just the provision of policing service but delivering that service in a manner, which meets public expectations. This is best described as policing by consent and it is this context which will inform the approach to reviewing policing service delivery by the BPD.

THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

5.4 The following outlines the supporting institutional framework for police service delivery.

1. Organizations, management and procedures must ensure policing is just, responsive, equitable, lawful, and participatory with other influential partnerships.
2. The power to influence policing must be distributed across a number of agencies and socio-economic groups to deepen democratic control.
3. Information about policing policy must be widespread, clear and accurate.
4. There should be various means to obtain redress for wrongful police action including independent investigations of citizen complaints.
5. The police should continue to retain its social service role in as much as it has to suppress civil disorders.
6. The use of force must be restrained and proportionate to the legal ends intended.

5.5 In Belize, policies, organizations and laws provide for most of these key elements. But while necessary, they are not sufficient since good service delivery requires effective leadership, management and supervision along with supporting mechanisms and procedures.

5.6 The following examines some institutional procedures and management weakness affecting police service delivery in Belize.

COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE

5.7 The number and nature of complaints against the police is one of many indicators of how police service is being delivered. It also serves to shape public perception of the police.

The following table shows an unduly high number of complaints made against the police for 2001-07

Table 5.1 **Complaints Against The Police – 2000-2007**

Year	No of Complaints	No of Constables	Ratio Complaints: Constables
2001	393	594	1:2
2002	429	621	1:2
2003	509	666	1:1
2004	389	688	1:02
2005	293	701	1:3
2006	336	725	1:2
2007	330	736	1:2

* Source: BPD and Ombudsman Annual Reports.

5.8 NB. These are complaints made to the Police and Ombudsman and are underestimates as the IAD reports that some districts sometimes do not make these reports available for compilation.

5.9 Viewed against the background of exceedingly high rates of police misconduct at table 5.1 There is a CRISIS OF NON- COMPLIANCE among Constables which is symptomatic of poor management and supervision within the department.

5.10 While some of the police annual reports highlight the nature of internal disciplinary offences and how they are dealt with, short shrift is made of citizens' complaints in all of these reports. The ranks involved are not shown, neither the nature of the complaints nor more importantly how the cases were disposed of nor penalties invoked. While some complaints are frivolous or malicious they remain one of the few important barometers of service delivery.

THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION (IAD)

5.11 There is an Internal Affairs Division (IAD) with a staff of 1 Superintendent and 4 members. The case load of each member is about 20 per person annually and their mandate is to investigate citizens' complaints and some disciplinary breaches.

5.12 The National Security Strategy of Belize requires that the IAD be "accountable to a Civilian/ Police Board" (p.65). Presently IAD investigate some serious cases of indiscipline related to departmental on-the-job related behaviour. They also investigate the majority of public complaints against the police but this is because the Office of the Ombudsman, whose mandate includes investigating complaints against the police, is not nationally decentralized. The Government should therefore seriously reconsider if in addition to the Ombudsman there is the need for another Independent Civilian Review Board.

5.13 The rise of these boards or the Office of the Ombudsman worldwide is a consequence of a citizenry, mistrustful of the Police and government agencies investigating their own for misconduct.

5.14 To therefore associate the IAD with any external mechanism for independent review will undermine the rationale for such reviews.

5.15 The mechanism for overseeing the investigation of misconduct not directly affecting citizens and which do not require external review should remain within the jurisdiction of the CoP and should be the proper task of the IAD. The IAD should not be investigating citizens' complaints of police misconduct but should record and pass over such cases to the Ombudsman or other Civilian Complaints Board which may be created.

52. It is therefore recommended that;

- Should the government decide to create an Independent Complaint Commission, serving police officers should not be on their staff.***
- The Ombudsman should continue to investigate complaints made to him/ her against the police IN THE MEANTIME.***
- The Ombudsman or other civilian review authority should direct the investigation of ALL of fatal or near fatal shootings by the police.***

- *The IAD should investigate breaches of police disciplinary rules not directly involving citizens and should record and hand over citizens' complaints against the police to the Ombudsman or other specific independent authority. Cases of corrupt behaviour should be reported to the Deputy Commissioner who should hand these over to the Anti-Corruption Unit recommended at P 61.*

LAX OVERSIGHT

5.16 Evidence suggest that many District CO and other senior ranks do not oversee the quality and timeliness of initial investigations of citizens' complaints pending the intervention of the IAD or Ombudsman.

"Sometimes these complaints are covered up and only come to light when citizens retain an attorney-at-law or personally visit the IAD officers at Belmopan or Belize City." (Sgt Jesus COBB, IAD Investigator)

Frequently, in cases where action is being taken, this is not communicated to the complainants who sometimes travel long journeys to the IAD offices only to discover that the matter is receiving attention. Some complainants highlight their frustration on radio talk shows and in the print media. All this often makes a bad situation worse, contributing to lowering public estimation of the police. This critical area of police service delivery is not getting the attention from police managers it deserves.

53. It is recommended that the policy of not providing status reports to complainants if the case is completed within 60 days, be amended (BPD Internal Investigations Administration Policy) so they can be updated more often.

THE OMBUDSMAN

5.17 Within its wide mandate, the office of Ombudsman is authorized to receive and investigate police misconduct. Given its workload, it is hardly likely that its staff of one investigator can adequately pursue the evidence wherever it leads, in the 300-350 cases reported yearly from all sources.

5.18 The Ombudsman has four volunteer representatives in some districts and villages but this fact is neither publicized nor known to citizens, so the inability of the Ombudsman to receive complaints against the police in districts outside Belize City leaves citizens reporting police abuse, to the police about 6-8 times more often than to the Ombudsman. The situation where the police is still SUBSTANTIALLY INVESTIGATING THEMSELVES can lead to a loss of public confidence in the process.

POLICE COMPLAINTS BOARD

5.19 Earlier efforts were made by the Ombudsman to create a Police Complaints Board within the authority of the Ombudsman Act. These efforts were not realized but there is a tripartite arrangement with the Ombudsman, the Head of IAD and the Chairman of the Human Rights Commission where meetings are held to review cases. The inclusion of the IAD in these activities while well intentioned can create the impression that the Ombudsman is not entirely independent of police influence.

54. It is recommended that;

- IAD investigations be kept apart from the Ombudsman.***
- One volunteer Ombudsman representative be appointed in all main towns in Belize and this fact be nationally publicized.***
- One investigator within the office of the Ombudsman be appointed solely to investigate complaints against the Police.***

MEDIA COMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC RELATIONS

5.20 There is a Police Public Information Policy for the BPD in effect since January 2001. A Public Relations Officer is a central figure in this Policy who is also the Media Communication Officer. He hosts a popular radio talk show which highlights policing issues in a positive manner. Outside of this, his public relations mandate in the policy is not exercised. Communications and relations with the media are good and some senior officers perform this function effectively.

55. It is recommended that a review be made of the Public Information Policy and that media communication shift from its passive to a more active role to AGGRESSIVELY AND POSITIVELY portray policing in the media especially police successes in notorious cases.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

5.21 There is the need for a Community Relations Division along with policies and a mandate in the BPD. While this activity is the responsibility of all members, the unit is required to present the human face of POLICING AS A PUBLIC GOOD in the constant battle to win hearts and minds in an often hostile and competitive environment.

56. It is recommended that;

- A Community Relations Unit be established.***
- The post of Public Relations Officer be abolished thus signaling the shift from PUBLIC RELATIONS and images associated with it to COMMUNITY RELATIONS, EMPOWERMENT AND PARTNERSHIPS.***

- *One member of this Unit, preferably a Sergeant, should be attached to all districts and divisions. He/ She would be fully occupied with media liaison, outreach programmes, the police sports programme and be an integral part of CBP.*
- *Many of the police outreach programmes and police sport programmes should be managed by this unit which should be headed by at least a SP at Police Headquarters.*

THE TIPPING POINT

5.22 Left unattended police service delivery will cause continued deterioration in public estimation of the police to a tipping point where it will take years to restore public trust. This will also be powerfully influenced by festering police corruption – if creeping corruption is left unchecked. Added to these are honest mistakes by the police which are likely to happen as they continue to confront rising crimes of violence related to guns and drugs.

NEW STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

5.23 These and other factors demonstrate the case for broadening the terrain for formulating effective policing strategic objectives such as to;

57. Develop a NATIONAL CRIME MANAGEMENT AND SERVICE DELIVERY STRATEGY cascading to hit the ground.

58. Implement a comprehensive CAPACITY STRENGTHENING PLAN designed to increase competency and improve physical and technological infrastructure.

59. Implement policies and training to confront and control police corruption and to tackle police indiscipline.

60. The following recommendations are more tactically focused on the delivering quality service.

- 1. More senior and experienced ranks should be deployed into traditional patrol functions.*
- 2. Officers must complete incident forms showing when citizens are arrested DUE TO STOP AND SEARCH OPERATIONS or when DETAINED for questioning.*

- 3. Supervision and visits of patrol staff should be done by ranks not lower than INSPECTORS and Sergeants.*
- 4. Commanding Officers should be held accountable for the quality and effectiveness of patrols and of service delivery.*
- 5. All BPD staff should undergo a 4 hour training course in TELEPHONE TECHNIQUES.*

- 6. Police reception areas should be redesigned and furnished to make them CUSTOMER FRIENDLY.*
- 7. Only certified customer service constables with more than 4 years service should serve as reception officers at larger stations.*
- 8. Recruit and in-service training must focus more on resolving and diffusing street hostilities and confrontation. See Cap 4.*

- 9. The rules regarding the humane treatment of prisoners must be promulgated understood and enforced.*
- 10. The service role of the police must be at the core of policing philosophy of the BPD.*
- 11. The minimum and proportionate use of force must be a topic in all pre-duty briefing and must be in the form of a comprehensive policy.*

12. The management of violence arising from civil confrontation and unrest must be taught in all police syllabi.

13. Public complaints about abuse of power and other police misconduct must be pursued with more vigour.

14. The BPD should publish the nature of complaints made against members and the results of action taken and final disposal in all annual reports.

15. Monthly written reports must be made to all complainants and VICTIMS outlining progress in their case until final disposal.

16. Designated and trained members must pay periodic visits to victims of crimes and complainants.

17. The police should guide, assist and advise where referral to government agencies and NGO's is needed especially for victims of crimes and vulnerable family members.

18. Promulgate and observe the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power approved by the General Assembly (Reso 40/34 of the 7th Congress); and the UN Minimum Standards on the Treatment of Prisoners the UN rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty G.A. Reso 45/113 of the 8th Congress.

19. Police managers and supervisors to continuously use all means to instill in the culture of the police, ethical behaviour and professional conduct.

20. The BPD should create a social compact with citizens in the form of a CITIZENS/ POLICE CHARTER. This should be done after widespread police consultation and a renewed police commitment.

21. First Aid Signs should be posted outside the entrance to all police stations and emergency medical supplies kept in reception areas.

22. Signs in English and Spanish showing that complaints against the police can be made to the Ombudsman (with address) be posted in Police reception areas and outside lockups at all facilities.

23. Desk Sergeants command all shifts at reception AREAS at all District Formation Head Stations.

5.24 The preceding recommendations are based upon observed weaknesses in the delivery of police services in keeping with the expectations of citizens.

5.25 Recommendations Nos 1, 3 and 4 are based on the premise that the police **cannot continue to deploy its lowest and most inexperienced ranks to perform its most critical task of delivering police service in public spaces, often under challenging situations while** MORE EXPERIENCED AND TRAINED STAFF PERFORM SUPPORT SERVICE ROLES.

5.26 Some of the above recommendations will require adjustments to ratios between Sergeants and Constables which are recommended in Cap 3.

5.27 However, recommended abolition of the ranks of corporal and SSP along with civilianization of many administrative tasks now performed by uniformed ranks will make a significant number of more experienced officers available for street duties. Civilianization is a cost effective joined up issue and should be tackled with urgency.

DISCIPLINE AND ETHICAL BEHAVIOUR

5.28 The unrecognized CRISIS OF NON-COMPLIANCE with the most basic work requirements of members in the BPD mentioned at para 5.9 is highlighted in Table 5.1 above, the following Table 5.2 and again in Table 5.3 at page 73.

Table 5.2 **Disciplinary Breaches and Ratios**

Year	No of Breaches	Ratios of Breaches: Constables	No of Constables in BPD
2000	338	1:2	592
2001	210	1:3	594
2002	362	1:2	621
2003	329	1:3	662
2004	379	1:2	688
2005	347	1:3	701
2006	358	1:2	725
2007	354	1:2	736

*** Source: Internal Affairs and Discipline**

5.29 Annually, between 3-8 breaches are double counted as complaints made against the police in table 5.2 above. The exact number cannot be ascertained due to police data gathering methods. It must also be borne in mind however that a number of complaints are sometimes groundless.


5.30 On the other hand, visits to stations especially during shift changes indicate that the non-compliance rates are even higher than the numbers suggest. The following table 5.3 merges the data in tables 5.1 and 5.2

Table 5.3 **Ratios-Disciplinary Breaches added to Complaints vs. Police**

Year	No of Disciplinary Breaches and Citizens Complaints	Ratios of Breaches and Complaints: Constables	No of Constables in BPD
2000	656	1:1	592
2001	603	1:1	594
2002	791	1:1	621
2003	838	1:1	662
2004	770	1:1	688
2005	579	1:1	701
2006	693	1:1	725
2007	687	1:1	736

* Decimal place omitted.

Graph 5.1 **Another View of Breaches and Complaints Against THE BPD**



5.31 Among the supervisory ranks of Corporal for the years 2005-06 the disciplinary non-compliance ratio was ONE BREACH TO EVERY FIVE CORPORALS. This is a SERIOUS INDICTMENT on the management and supervisory effectiveness of the senior staff despite the improved non-compliance ratios for this rank in subsequent years.

5.32 The statistics compiled and published relating to police misconduct rarely indicate the offences committed; never show a clear distinction between internally oriented misconduct identified by Senior Officers and supervisors as compared to misconduct grounding complaints which are made by citizens. These are not added to citizens' complaints to the Ombudsman. The penalties imposed show no correspondence with the offences committed but are kept rolling over from year to year so the effectiveness of the disciplinary outcomes cannot be evaluated. Additionally the statistics do not indicate how complaints made by citizens are concluded. The whole format is obfuscating, making it appear that managers would rather not know the important facts about police indiscipline.

5.33 The model of disciplinary compliance and enforcement in the department is para-military, in that it's emphasis is;

1. Rule Bound and "order" directed.
2. Command and top down oriented.

3. Hierarchy dependent.
4. Obedience centered via military drills and written orders and
5. Punishment based, for conformity.

5.34 All this have had a strong negative influence on the work related cultural values and attitudes of lower ranks in the BPD described in Cap 4. The methods used to ENFORCE CONFORMITY among members in any Police Department MUST HAVE A POWERFUL INFLUENCE ON METHODS used by them to ENFORCE CONFORMITY by citizens especially those with LOWER SOCIAL BADGES OF RANK. Changing these structures and processes (described at para 5.33 above) can improve the cultural values and practices of the BPD in keeping with public expectations.

5.35 The usual response to rule breaking in the BPD is to promulgate more rules. The last observed case involved widespread departure from the police standing orders on granting bail. This elicited another round of rules and reminders instead of reviewing the reasons for non-compliance, taking corrective action and holding staff accountable.

PROFESSIONAL GUIDANCE IN ENCOUNTERS

5.36 Radio communication is hardly used to provide guidance to junior ranks during encounters in the field. This is because standard rules of radio communication when initiating public field contact is not enforced so ex post facto reporting have become the norm. The absence of shift station Sergeants have also contributed to this breakdown.

THE ROOTS OF INDISCIPLINE

5.37 The BPD depends upon military drill to instill obedience but unlike the military, it is in rare cases that drill is required during the remainder of the officers' career after graduation. Allied to this disjuncture is another. The highly militarized nature of police training stresses continuous close over the shoulder supervision and group discipline which are proven military techniques which serve the central mission and organization of military forces. However for the Constable, this level of supervision disappears while on duty. As an Officer of the Peace at common law, he is singularly responsible for his acts to enforce the law so

statutes like the Public Authorities Protection Act are used intervene to make other state officials liable.

5.38 He is legally required to act with good judgement and discretion, qualities spoken about but not developed during training. Additionally, the constable when accused of wrongful action cannot plea that he was complying with orders of his superiors.

5.39 The current approach is still in favour of the once truthful, but now falsified assumption that there is close on the job supervision and continuous military drill after the academy, to maintain compliance. Colonial policing did not permit this, so the BPD will have to tip the balance in three directions.

5.40 One is to improve on the job supervision of lower ranks and by ensuring better management along with more engagement of Senior Ranks in front line policing. Another is to place much greater emphasis on ethic based behaviour and the development of good judgement, self discipline and a greater commitment to professionalism throughout the department.

5.41 Another noticeable challenge is that some senior members are often influenced by the “halo effect” created by lower ranks whom pay excessive obeisance in the form of military rituals often for the purpose of compensating for work and character deficiencies. They frequently “beat the system”.

5.42 Many recommendations in this review will close these disjunctive gaps and adjust the disciplinary regime from “other directedness” to individualized “inner directedness”.

5.43 The transformation of the BPD into an entirely civil police department would help but is not recommended because of the need to configure police resources to face transnational threats and to protect large jungle areas with over 300 miles of porous land border often in collaboration with military forces. The current model fits local circumstances and the foreseeable future directions for public safety.

5.44 However, despite the need for close police/ military collaboration, the continuous engagement of military forces in the arena of the criminal law can degrade their preparedness and inclination to use overwhelming force when required to use different rules of engagement in military encounters. Correspondingly, sustained employment of the police in military operations will easily pervert their service role and undermine public estimation of their professional standing as keepers of the peace. It is for these reasons that many democracies have created para-military “Third forces” designed to confront violence on a continuum above that which the entire police department should not be trained and armed to confront and below which the military should not be involved. **This is an option for consideration** and could involve the amalgamation of the SPU and about 150 BPD members into an effective “Third Force”.

5.45 As a caution it must be said that the management of violence requires the threat of overwhelming military force be BACKGROUNDED in such a way that it often reduces the need to be FOREGROUNDED. The nation’s military must be held in respectful dread, awe and admiration by citizens. The arena of policing is the surest place to lose this along with the psychological shock of the mere deployment of military force on the streets, which – without more- can avoid bloodshed.

ETHICAL BEHAVIOUR

5.46 Ethical behaviour is at the core of efforts of policing for consent and public trust, due to the recurring temptation facing the police to try to achieve “just ends” by unjust means. (Noble Cause Corruption) One of many realistic examples would be where the police have FACTUALLY sound evidence of the guilt of a child rapist and murderer which is not JUDICIALLY acceptable. They sometimes manipulate/ convert this to concocted judicial evidence to secure a guilty verdict and justify this on account of their estimation of factual guilt of the offender; the demands for deserved JUST DESERTS and the likelihood of innocent lives to be saved in the future. No evidence of this has been unearthed here but it has led to many police scandals and inquires in the UK and around the world.

5.47 Exposure to bribes and gifts and the often contradictory demands of police peers, friends and family, Senior Officers, citizens and the state can sometimes pose ethical dilemmas for Police Officers. The ethics of care; of virtue; the Kantian ethics of duty compared with the Benthamite consequentialist ethics of utility along with Judeo-Christian ethics are rich themes for exploration to deepen understanding. This is a good springboard to encourage and embed ethical and spiritual values, attitudes and action of individual officers.

CORRUPTION

5.48 There is ample evidence of creeping corruption among members of the BPD. International studies have shown that left unchallenged this will fester, and given sufficient time become endemic. This must be confronted with urgency.

5.49 The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International in 2008 has moved Belize from a score of 2.9 defined as serious (based on surveys) in 2007 to a score of 3.0 defined as a perception of RAMPANT corruption. Among the 180 countries surveyed, Belize sits at 109 and in 2007 was ranked 21st of 32 countries in the region. Additionally, studies have shown a positive correlation between corruption and a high murder rate.

5.50 Confronting police corruption has to be integrated with national anti-corruption measures.

61. Hence it is recommended that;

- An anti-corruption policy, strategy and public awareness programme be designed along with a NATIONAL ANTI- CORRUPTION UNIT consisting of specially vetted and selected staff be organized as a matter of urgency.***

- Its mandate must include ALL corrupt practices in the POLICE AND ALL GOVERNEMENT MINISTRIES, DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES AND THE FINANCIAL SECTOR.***
- ETHICS OFFICERS be appointed in the BPD, all Ministries and Government agencies along with their mandates.***

- *The National Assembly act to apply all requirements of the Prevention of Corruption Act to all Public Officers and NCO and lower grade staff in all departments.*
- *The unit should not be housed in police stations and should employ some civilian staff.*

- *It should be covert and proactive enough to create a REAL APPREHENSION OF DETECTION.*
- *It should operate on the need to know rule.*
- *The covert nature of its operations should be well promulgated.*

- *It should quickly focus on getting results in highly suspicious cases where there is credible intelligence.*
- *Comprehensive vetting systems including random polygraph tests be put in place and applied to all commissioned ranks and holders of sensitive posts in government.*

- *The directors of the Anti Corruption Unit report directly either to the CoP and/ or CEO of MNS or CEO Ministry of Finance and insulated from direction of other Senior Officers.*
- *Confidential protocols be developed for its covert operations.*

- *More complete declaration of bonafides be made by commissioned ranks and sensitive post holders with legal sanctions/ dismissals to result from untruthful statements.*
- *All members of the BPD, CUSTOMS, BDF, TRANSPORT AND IMMIGRATION DEPARTMENTS complete a detailed declaration of assets TWICE ANNUALLY.*

- *Harsher legal penalties be drafted for corrupt practices.*
- *Clear rules concerning behaviour in the private lives of the members of the department be drafted and enforced.*

- ***The BPD should enforce existing rules about the business interests and private employment by members and the acceptance of even the smallest gift without written approval.***

THE PROPOSED DRAFT CONDITION OF SERVICE REGULATION

5.51 While the Legal distinctions between senior and junior police officers and the different conditions of service and disciplinary measures are appreciated, there is no need to legislate for different RULES OF CONDUCT as between the managers and those managed in a modern Police Department. This is a quaint retention of pre-independence differences CONSTRUCTED BY OTHERS FOR OTHER PURPOSES. This is reflected in the Draft Conditions of Service Regulations 2008 for the BPD where clause 15-19(e) are compared 19(2) (a) and to 19(2) (ff). These rules should be amended by legal draftsmen to include all members of the BPD.

62. It is recommended that the responsibility for training policy should be vested in the Minister of National Security in keeping with the Constitutional responsibility of the Cabinet and the National Assembly for National Security Policies and not with the CoP as proposed in these Draft Regulation.

5.52 Sec 20 (5) headed “Appointment of Defense Advocate” prohibits the appointment of attorneys-at-law to defend junior ranks but Senior Officers are permitted this under Sec 21 (d).

63. It is recommended that this inequitable distinction be omitted and as is the case in other commonwealth jurisdictions, junior ranks be also permitted to be represented by an attorney of their choice. See R.V Commissioner of Police Ex. parte Edwards (1977) 17 ALR.445

5.53 The Commissioned ranks will have the right to have documents shown before they are used as evidence but disclosures at P16 of the draft suggest that this will not be done with regard to junior ranks. This distinction should also be omitted.

64. It is recommended that;

- The principles and processes of Restorative Justice be included in the “Draft Regulations”.***
- Grievance procedures be created in the Draft.***

- The rule making language used in the “Draft Regulation” and current standing orders of the BPD be changed to affirm expected behaviour rather than prohibit a long list of deviating behaviours. It DISCOURAGES OWNERSHIP OF MISCONDUCT and leaves less space for pride and personal commitment to professional policing and self discipline.***

CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER

5.54 Improved leadership, a new approach to training, embedded ethical behaviour, professionalism, enriched rituals and modern compliance systems can together create a chain reaction leading to a **POLICE CULTURE** where self discipline and committed individuals become commonplace.

65. It is recommended that the AIDT engage in a joined up approach to strengthen the institutional capacity and reshape the culture of the BPD.

Chapter 6

Terms of Reference:

Review the Policies and Practices Regarding Use of Force, Observance of Human Rights and Custodial Practices and Make Recommendations

USE OF FORCE

6.1 The use of force has always been problematic for Police Officers even in the best managed police departments.

6.2 Compared to the Caribbean and other countries in Central America, Belize cannot be classified as a violent prone society, so this issue is not at the forefront of the policing agenda even though there is sufficient evidence that its increasing frequency is causing concerns. However, unless the increasing cases of violence can be contained by improved police service delivery and crime containment; social intervention in schools and communities; by better parenting practices and greater opportunities for youth, the challenge to control crime will increase and continue to reduce public trust.

6.3 The use of force by the police is best examined against the background of the readiness of citizens and police to use force against each other and the ability of the police to defuse violent prone encounters using minimum and proportionate force within a framework of established policy and accepted practice.

6.4 This is a cross cutting issue and many aspects are otherwise addressed throughout this review especially regarding police service delivery and training.

GENDER AND USE OF FORCE

6.5 It is useful to further highlight the need for more female Police Officers recommended in Cap 3 within the context of the use of force, because world wide research have shown that too frequently the tactical choice of male officers often places them at risk of physical confrontation. On the other hand, female officers usually adopt tactics emphasizing mutual power sharing in the enforcement encounter. They use coercive tactics less frequently and in different contexts than male officers and as a result, experience less verbal and physical abuse during encounters. Furthermore, in Caribbean cultures, there is a strong inclination among males not to physically attack female authority figures in PUBLIC SPACES especially in view of other females.

LEGAL PENALTIES

66. It is recommended that the penalties for offenders found guilty of aggravated assaults on Police, Prison and Judicial Officers should be increased and well publicized both to create a deterrent effect and as symbolic protection of officers of the state.

STANDING ORDERS ON THE USE OF FORCE

6.6 The BPD standing orders to members governing the use of force which is at **APPENDIX 6** takes a MOST UNHELPFUL approach to the often complex situations in which police officers sometimes find themselves, especially regarding the use of lethal force. Among its many flaws is the absence of emphasis on the principle of proportionality.

67. It is recommended that a new USE OF FORCE POLICY be prepared to;

- Set out the basic principles in relation to the selection, testing, acquisition and use of firearms and less lethal weapons by police;*
- Set out the manner in which those principles are to be implemented within the Police Department.*

- *Provide a statement on standards of competence, accreditation and operational practice relating to police use of firearms and less lethal weapons;*
- *Ensure that observance of these principles, and the standards for implementation, results in a systematic programme of continuous development of police policy, practice and capability;*

- *Promote compatibility of operating procedures for such weapons, in order to support procedures for testing and maintaining standards of competence, and to support operations.*
- *Foster the identification and promulgation of good practice;*

- *Encourage and support the continuing development and improvement of police responses to potentially violent situations, and police management of conflict.*
- *An introductory chapter should stress the importance of the policy and its underlying Human Rights objective, while one chapter or section each should be devoted to the following topics.*

- *The Belizean and relevant Caribbean case law with explanations of the policing circumstances and the reason for the decision.*
- *The personal legal responsibility of Police Officers.*
- *The relevant aspects of treaties such as the UN code of conduct for law enforcement officials (8th UN Congress, Havana 27/8/90. UN Doc A/Conf.144/28).*

- *The use of non-lethal forces generally and threats by others to use force.*
- *The use of firearms and lethal force along with Constitutional and Legislative provisions.*
- *Explanations of the lethality of weapons used and examples of the excessive use of force.*

- *Policies and practices regarding the qualification and periodic certification prior to being issued with various weapons.*
- *Vehicular pursuit operations.*
- *Planned operations where firearms are issued.*

- *Briefing, Command and Control relating to operations.*
- *Medical assistance.*
- *Records to be kept.*
- *Threat assessment, post incident procedures and tactical review.*

- *Use of force during civil disturbance, riots and unlawful assemblies.*
- *The detailed meaning of proportionality and the meaning of a clear and immanent danger with examples and scenarios to concretize good judgement.*

- *Investigations to be done.*
- *Reports to be made.*
- *The safety and protection of self and others.*
- *The objectives of protecting human rights.*

- *Psychological assessments and counseling.*
- *NEW LESSONS LEARNED.*
- *Details of weapons recovered and arrests made.*
- *Use of special weapons.*

- *Warning shots be fired only in exceptional cases.*

It is further recommended that all District and Station commanders be designated Firearm Control Officers to enforce the provisions of this policy relative to firearms.

6.7 The common theme running through this policy should be proportionality and the protection of HUMAN RIGHTS, citizens, community and the state. The document should be STANDARD POLICE ISSUE TO ALL RANKS and should be included in all training syllabi.

HUMAN RIGHTS

68. In keeping with the NSS of Belize, it is recommended that the BPD adopt the Human Rights agenda more aggressively at all levels of management, operations, training and education. This should be cascaded from strategies and policies to operational tactics and the treatment of offenders, victims and prisoners. The OBJECTIVES OF POLICING must constantly portray its crime reduction roles as means used for the promotion of FREEDOM, protection of HUMAN RIGHTS and preservation of TRANQUILITY.

69. It is recommended that this change should be reflected in the often used Police language couched exclusively in crime control objectives and reflected in communications among themselves and to the media; in their strategies, policies, rule making, reports and the way they present themselves and their work to the citizens, international organizations and to the world. This, along with improved police service delivery practices can have a powerful influence on improved public confidence in the police.

6.8 This will require a major shift in police training and education and the auditing of policies and practices. All this must be joined up to the processes of **Embedding Ethical Behaviour** in the police culture. This must move beyond paper statements of principles and beyond fine rhetoric towards action oriented outcomes.

6.9 One of the many links between observing Human Rights and Police Ethics, is the principle of proportionality requiring a balance between the protection of individual rights and the interests of the community. It requires that Police Officers justify the means used, against the outcome intended and ensure that such action is proportionate to the legitimate aim. This is best taught by role play and case studies based upon actual events experienced by BPD members. (See Training at Cap 4)

6.10 All of this should be joined up to performance management and assessment of and by police leaders and stakeholders as they measure the efficacy of these judgements, action, outputs and outcomes that matter to people.

CUSTODIAL PRACTICES AND PRISONERS RIGHTS

6.11 Inspection of Police lockups and prisoners reveal no evidence of assaults on them. However, many cells are insufficiently ventilated and prisoners are required to sleep on the concrete floors. Live electrical wires are assessable to prisoners at some stations. In many cases prisoners who are arrested on Fridays and who are not bailed, are not taken before a Justice of the Peace to be remanded as required by the Police Act.

6.12 Often, the arresting officer does not formally record if the prisoner can be granted bail, so in his absence (sometimes one or two days off), the prisoner is not bailed even if a surety turns up. It is observed that even Inspectors in charge of stations, in the absence of good reasons, defer to junior arresting officers. Comprehensive BPD standing orders on bail are not observed and steps are not taken to hold anyone accountable. The knee jerk reaction is to write more orders to pass downwards as non-compliance continues.

70. It is recommended that Junior Officers responsible for small stations and Station Sergeants at larger stations be appointed CUSTODY OFFICERS who will decide if an arrested person is to be taken into custody and invoke the provision of the Standing Orders on bail. This responsibility should be delegated by the senior member in his/ her absence. Unless members are held accountable, non-compliance will continue.

6.13 There are no notices visibly posted, listing the rights of prisoners as required by The United Nations (UN) Convention Concerning the Rights of Prisoners. Most lockups exude an overpowering stench. On my visit to the Queen Street Police Station on Tuesday 10th June 2008, one prisoner complained that he was not allowed to make a telephone call. An ASP present told me that CIB staff should have allowed it. These are recurring complaints and lame excuses.

6.14 This and other shortcomings enumerated elsewhere in this report demonstrates pronounced weakness in the maintenance of performance standards and accountability by the Senior Ranks of the BPD. There is a noticeable merging between formal rules and informal rules of errant policing practice. The operational assumptions regarding prisoners in police custody is that they are there FOR PUNISHMENT not for guilt or innocence to be judicially decided.

OFFICER SAFETY AND SECURITY OF PRISONERS

6.15 The padlocks on cell doors are of poor quality and easily “picked” Some passageways leading to cells should be redesigned to create “man traps” before entering and after leaving the cells. This could be easily done at stations like Orange Walk Town, Dangriga and many others. Access to prisoners by climbing over a fence during dark is not difficult at stations like Ladyville. Loose electrical wires dangle like webs around some cells. In case of fire, there are no fire safety plans nor predetermined and secure assembly point for the safety of officers and security of prisoners.

6.16 After my visits, notices have been posted to inform prisoners of their rights at SOME stations.

71. It is recommended that in the short run;

- ***All police lockups be thoroughly cleaned.***
- ***Adequate cleaning material be made available to prisoners to keep lockups clean.***

- ***All cells be adequately ventilated.***
- ***All electrical safety violations be corrected.***
- ***A Standard Operating Procedure manual on secure and humanitarian custody of prisoners and officer safety be developed and used.***

- *More secure locks be installed on cell doors.*
- *Man traps be constructed where practicable.*
- *Safe assembly areas be selected especially at Head District Stations for the safety of staff, visitors and prisoners in case of fire.*
- *Custodial practices be treated more adequately in training and in-service training syllabi.*

Chapter 7

Terms of Reference:

Review Policies and Practices with Regards to Prevention and Control of Crime, Police Operation, Policing Plans and Communications and Make Recommendations. N.B Policing Plans are addressed in Cap 2

CRIME CONTROL AND PREVENTION STRATEGIES

7.1 The NSS of Belize seeks to control crime at various levels. Macro level social intervention and quality of life programmes aim to increase entrepreneurship, employment and educational opportunities; restore communities, strengthen the primary institutions of socialization and improve the Criminal Justice System and democratic governance.

7.2 Serious criminal threats to national stability are identified and an array of strategic actions are enumerated which can all serve to confront and prevent serious criminal threats to the nation.

7.3 Some police strategies have extended and enriched community/ policing partnerships and increased their presence in public spaces. While existing, FORESEEABLE challenges are recognized in the NSS, implementation will require competences, and technological support which are in short supply in the BPD.

LEGISLATION AND TARGET HARDENING

7.4 Among the remaining challenges are the expansion of a legislative regime for crime control; a wider range of sentencing measures, target hardening and situational crime control tactics; defense and control of private and public space – especially crime prone urban space – along with greater efforts to rehabilitate Juveniles and young adult first offenders.

7.5 Studies all over the world have shown that many young offenders who are not re-socialized and given opportunities to become useful citizens will go on to a life of crime. Resources dedicated to their rehabilitation offer powerful crime reduction benefits.

72. In this regard, *it is recommended that*

a) The present study of the Juvenile Justice System be expedited.

7.6 Additionally, old common law sentencing powers relating to Threats, Breaches of the Peace, Affray and misprision of felony have been statutorily revitalized elsewhere with significant benefits for crime control.

73. *It is recommended that a comprehensive CRIME PREVENTION STRATEGY AND POLICY with action plans and timelines be prepared by the AIDT. The following are just examples:*

a) An array of TARGET HARDENING situational and legal crime prevention measures such as

b) Construction of strategically located cul-de-sacs and one ways integrated with surveillance to control movement.

c) Creation of City and Town Council regulations requiring minimum security standards at groceries and supermarkets which are the location of choice for many robbers and murders.

d) Targeted improvement to street lighting.

e) Coordinated approach between urban planners, City, Town and Village Councils to use urban planning as a means of crime prevention.

f) Rented small one storey surveillance police posts.

g) Construction of semi-gated communities in high crime urban areas by restricting road ingress and egress along with naturally occurring obstacles as boundaries.

- h) Cooperation with the relevant ministries and urban planners, to build in the concept and practice of Defensible space in urban areas and new human settlements.*
- i) A crime prevention unit be resuscitated in the BPD to pro actively advice commercial enterprises and householders about crime prevention and safety issues.*

AN OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL ACT

7.7 Communities want to get more involved in crime prevention. Rather than just TALK about it, they want to HELP DO IT, hence the need for a LEGISLATED STRUCTURE and CLEAR LEGAL MANDATE for a community safety network to enhance the coordination between communities and their local police who will be required to respond to and work with as a MEASURE of their performance. The absence of this approach has led to failures of police citizens' liaison efforts all around the Anglophone Caribbean.

74. It is therefore recommended that the government introduce an OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND PREVENTION ACT which would among other things legislate for a framework of MEANINGFUL CRIME AND DISORDER PARTNERSHIPS working together to prevent crime. This should include but is not limited to;

- Community Based Police Staff.*
- People's Coalition Committees.*
- City, Town and Village Councils.*
- Police Community Service Officers sworn as Special Constables.*
- The CYDP and YFF*
- NGO's, Faith Based and Women's Organization.*
- Tourism Interest and Neighbourhood Watches.*
- Citizens on Patrol Groups.*
- Resident members of the BDF.*
- Justices of the Peace.*

This should not be a “Talking shop” but instead be tasked with ACTION AND ASSISTANCE to prevent crime and conduct district crime audits. The partnership should be District, City, Town, Village and neighbourhood based and membership would differ according to location. Annual Reports of their activities should be tabled in the Assembly and a small budget be provided. The police should be required to provide the partnership with local crime statistics in a quarterly report.

75. THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND PREVENTION ACT should also create JUVENILE AND ADULT DIVERSION programmes which are OUT OF COURT DISPOSALS as an alternative to prosecution AFTER ARRESTS. The programme would allow the police to offer voluntary agreements to low risk, low level and mostly first time offenders, the chance to make reparation if appropriate and abide by conditions in return for holding the prosecution in abeyance. (See recommendation below) This is separate from but complementary with the first offenders programme where offenders are not arrested. This latter programme should however be legalized under this Act.

76. This measure would;

- Reduce judicial case load in appropriate cases.*
- Reduce the contaminative effects of imprisonment.*
- Allow passive surveillance of petty offenders by reporting procedures.*
- Have conditions for curfews.*
- Permit continuous data collection on petty offenders and their cohorts.*
- Reduce unnecessary police case load among other things.*

77. Exemplary penalties should be provided for second offenders or breach of conditions of agreements. It is recommended that if the suggestion to introduce the Omnibus Crime Control and Prevention Act is accepted, then the crime prevention provisions of the Crime Control and Criminal Justice Act be transferred to the new legislation. If this new legislation is not accepted, then the other option would be to amend the Crime Control and Criminal Justice Act to include the recommended proposals that are accepted.

7.8 Following are some examples of a legislative regime for the Omnibus Crime Control and Prevention Act. Some of these actions might be more tidily done by amendments to other acts. The Hon. Attorney General should further advise on this.

A REFORMED LEGISLATIVE REGIME FOR CRIME CONTROL AND PREVENTION

78. It is recommended that the GoB create a Criminal Law Reform Commission to strengthen the Criminal Laws and Laws of evidence in keeping with the trend in other Democracies.

79. In the meantime it is recommended that the Omnibus Crime Control Act also provide for;

- A custody and control order which is a sentence for listed crimes where offenders released from custody would enter a controlled regime supervised by the police. This would also enable the police to impose curfews if necessary.*
 - Registration of Bicycles*
 - Adequate legal protection for an enhanced Witness Protection Programme*
-
- Electronically controlled home custody in appropriate circumstances. (Reduces the cost of imprisonment.) Police Information Technology Unit (PITU) can implement.*
 - A statutory offence of misprision of felony, a common law offence now hedged in by case law.*
 - Shifting the burden of proof at outset of trial for a longer list of crimes.*
 - Absolute statutory custodial remand for Listed crimes committed (charged by police) while on bail.*

- *A criminal offence to have gunpowder residue on hands and arms without lawful excuse.*
- *Police registration and control of*
 - (a) Habitual serious offenders (statutorily defined)*
 - (b) Street vendors*
 - (c) Motor vehicle repair garages.*

- *Making it easier for the police to prosecute for perjury and longer sentences which are revocable after giving evidence in conformity with written statements/ depositions.*

- *Prosecution for extortion on police complaint only in certain circumstances.*
- *Making it easier for plea bargaining with offenders by the police and prosecutors.*
- *Out of court disposals of persons arrested for listed offenders based on written agreement to abide by conditions and to hold prosecution in abeyance.*

- *Demolition of derelict buildings and those declared as places of public nuisance. Attach cost to title and sell to recover if not settled.*
- *Compulsory Social Security Registration with picture ID.*
- *Mandatory possession of drivers license while driving a motor vehicle.*

- *Fixed penalty tickets for a list of summary jurisdiction offences.*
- *Covert intercept of communication with necessary protection of rights to privacy.*

- *A major reform of probation with more demanding conditions as done in most democracies.*
- *Suspended sentence with demanding conditions and imprisonment for relapse.*

- *A wider mix of sentencing measure such as*
 - * *Fines and probation*
 - * *Fines and Community Service Orders*
 - * *Short Sentences of imprisonment mixed with any of the above.*
- *Week-end imprisonment for certain offenders with jobs and stable families.*

POLICE OPERATIONS

7.9 The operations portfolio is managed by an ACP who reports to the CoP. He is also responsible for Criminal Investigations and Special Branch. While written strategies and objectives are fairly well developed, there are insufficient mechanisms, techniques, data collection and analysis to translate this into action to achieve crime control objectives. Consequently, with the exception of specialist patrol units, passive routine patrol deployment is based upon broad generalizations and guesstimates. Quite often there is a delay in reacting to shifting operational priorities such as emerging “warm spots”. Foot Patrol Staff is not moved around via vehicles from quadrant to quadrant giving the impression of POLICE OMNIPRESENCE. While patrolling “on wheels” officers do not get out and patrol “from wheels”.

CRIME ATTACK PATROLS

80. It is recommended that in high crime zones, the BPD employs a wider range of high impact anti – crime measures. This includes ZERO VISIBILITY patrols using unmarked battered vehicles with human decoys; frequent street interrogations, location specific stakeouts, sting operations with “baits” and a mix of preventative and crime attack foot patrol at critical time and in critical places which will be effective.

Police patrol tactics LACK IMAGINATION, INITIATIVE, FEEDBACK AND ASSESSMENT. Deep Covert Agents (DCA) are hardly if ever employed based on the myth that even if well planned, secrecy cannot be maintained.

CRIME INFORMATION FLOW

7.10 There is no systemized daily nor weekly flow of information, analyzed statistics, targets, achievements and challenges between the STAFF of Criminal Investigation, CIU, the specialist units and uniformed patrol AT THE LOWER LEVELS. As between uniformed patrols to these units, intelligence flow is the exception. Uniformed patrol staff is WORKING BLIND TO VITAL INTELLIGENCE DATA they pass by daily. Because of this disjointed approach to intelligence led policing, supervisors do not bother to conduct/ impose briefing and debriefing of uniformed patrol staff. A weak attempt to analyze crime figures are ONLY made weekly to Senior Ranks. This is then passed to Inspectors who are expected to use this at briefings. This in turn is hardly ever done because it is not helpful to patrol staff. Reacting to this information gap, the CIB does frequent “net fishing” night patrols which are wasteful of investigative manpower unless –as sometimes happens- it is directed towards a specific investigative objective.

7.11 This uncoordinated approach to policing in Belize has made policing a costly and ineffective enterprise capable of absorbing a 30%-40% increase in manpower without adding much to efficiencies.

81. It is recommended that;

- CIB and CIU staff conduct briefing and debriefing of all patrol staff going and returning off duty at all major stations. This should include systematically designed computerized data forms.***
- Small pocket intelligence report cards should also be used by the entire uniformed and administrative staff including Special Constables for daily transmission to the CIU for computerized storage, cross reference, analysis and dissemination.***

- *A weekly gazette of analyzed statistics, recent offenders and arrests be circulated. This should include targets met and unmet, outcomes, emerging challenges, stolen vehicles, photos of wanted persons and released prisoners.*

SPECIALIST UNITS

7.12 The operations portfolio includes a number of units reflecting specialist division of labour which are configured to confront threats identified in the NSS. This includes the SPECIAL PATROL UNIT which is a public order unit, consisting of three (3) Commissioned Officers and 62 other ranks. The group which has 5 vehicles is barracked in overcrowded conditions in Belmopan while smaller groups are deployed nationwide.

7.13 The Unit is understaffed by about 30 members and thoroughly under resourced materially. Shields and bullet resistant vest are obsolete and there are no night vision binoculars. The all terrain capacity of its vehicles is defective limiting mobility in off road conditions. The staff is adequately trained but the attempt to cover all contingencies nationwide has left the unit STRETCHED TOO THIN leaving Belmopan and Belize City too vulnerable to public order threats for about 2 hours. The Quick Response Teams are not trained nor equipped as a holding action response. Many are staffed by partially trained Special Constables.

82. It is recommended that;

- a) At least 10 members be trained and attached to the unit immediately as a temporary measure until further staff training and increases. (See also staff additions recommended below at recommendation 82)***
- b) The unit be provided with equipment resources identified by its commander. This should include modern less than lethal weapons such as Tasers.***

ANTI DRUG UNIT

7.14 The same inadequacies outlined above apply to the Anti Drug Unit (ADU) which consists of 40 officers. Additionally, the budget for petrol severely limits the mobility of this unit while the meager budget for intelligence gathering from informants is unrealistic. It must be repeated that the absence of technology and legislation for intercepting communication necessary to validate and upgrade intelligence from CHIS severely limits INTERDICTION EFFECTIVENESS.

7.15 Like the Special Patrol Unit, this unit is well managed and does well with its less than minimum acceptable resources. However ONE MARKED WEAKNESS, of this unit is its inclination to seize drugs and precursor chemicals prematurely instead of planned surveillance leading to organized leaders of criminal networks and HIGH PROFILE ARRESTS. The commander claims a lack of resources to be able to do this. This appears justified in view of the risk and consequences inherent in the loss of the find due to surveillance failure caused by inadequate basic technology and training.

7.16 The ADU is a UNIFORMED unit trying to be intelligence gatherers, interdictive actors and a public order unit simultaneously. This is inefficient since THERE IS NO NARCOTIC INTELLIGENCE UNIT IN THE BPD.

83. It is recommended that 20 members be transferred to the SPU and another 20 be converted to a narcotic intelligence plain clothes team within a reformed NIB (See SB Report) working in close collaboration with CIU officers. Major Anti Narcotic interdiction should be executed by a vetted and polygraphed group within the SPU which will continue to be the premier public order unit. This Narcotic Intelligence Unit should be attached to all districts and help close the gap created by the ABSENCE OF CIU STAFF in all district except Belize.

There are assurances from the US Embassy through the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) that they WILL FUND THE COST OF SPACE FOR THIS REDEPLOYMENT which should be district-wide to be symmetrical with the extent of the challenge.

TOOLS OF THE INFORMATION WAR

7.17 This unit in addition to the CIU, Gang Violence Unit and Special Branch (SB) are seriously constrained in the INFORMATION WAR with criminals, from upgrading intelligence from CHIS because of the absence of intelligence technology. These include but are not limited to;

- Electronic Tracking Transmitters and receivers.
- Amplified Listening devices.
- Low light, high zoom videography.
- Electronic transmitters.
- Night vision binoculars.
- Multi frequency radio wave interceptors.
- Facsimile transmission scanners, etc
- A pool of decoy transportation
- Cell phone and land line intercept devices. (See also list in separate report on SB)

7.18 These deficiencies in basic intelligence and policing technologies have been a major disadvantage in breaking up major criminal networks and have directed interdiction efforts on CARELESS MINOR CRIMINALS and common foot soldiers who are replaced as quickly as they are arrested. This technology would have to be shared by all units including the Intelligence Service on a needs basis.

ROAD POLICING

7.19 There are 2050 miles of main arterial highways and several hundred miles of minor marl/ limestone roads in Belize. CRIMINALS USE THESE ROADS EVERY DAY to carry out their activities so well planned and managed ROAD POLICING POLICIES and tactics can make them vulnerable to police interdiction. This is not the case in the BPD. Instead various units PATROL THE ROADS all with different objectives. These include the Traffic Unit, Anti-Drug, Special Patrol Units along with minimal coverage by routine patrol vehicles. But no single person has any idea of where or how much police coverage is provided by

these units or where their various areas of interest on roadways may converge. Neither is there data on roads not being patrolled. ROAD POLICING IS TOTALLY FRAGMENTED.

84. It is recommended that this challenge be addressed by a small Road Policing Unit which would retrospectively collect road coverage, interdiction statistical and intelligence data from all police units using road ways. Analyze this and provide advisories to relevant staff and review results. Necessary action should be initiated by heads of Units.

7.20 Presently the Traffic Department deploys a vehicle on highway patrol. The staff is primarily traffic centered. (See Cap 12 on Traffic policing)

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE UNIT

7.21 This unit is staffed by 1 Inspector and 24 members; its caseload is approximately 10 per person monthly.

7.22 Graph 7.1 below shows the number of domestic violence cases reported to the police from 2001-2007. Despite the decreases between 2006-2007 there is an increase in the overall trend. Women and children are the main victims and there are little facilities to help the children traumatized by these events. About 68.5% of all reports against males are held in abeyance primarily because of female economic dependence on male partners. Female unemployment rate is 18.96 which is twice that of males. (Labour Force Survey, Statistical Institute 2007)

7.23 The difference between reports and court orders is due to the fact that other agencies also bring cases to the Family Court.

Graph 7.1 **Domestic Violence-Belize City**



BICYCLE PATROL UNITS

7.24 Bicycle patrols allow silent and wide ground patrol coverage while maintaining closer face to face contact with citizens. It is a widespread patrol tactic in urban areas all over the world yet it is only employed in a limited way by the Tourism Police Unit.

85. It is recommended that specially attired and equipped Bicycle Patrol Units be created and deployed in Belize City, Belmopan City and all main District Towns.

86. That in addition to its traffic responsibilities the highway patrol staff be trained to be multi-skilled in areas of drug and firearms interdiction, human trafficking and public order policing. This will improve value for money and be an example of policing best practice.

7.25 Effective Road Policing Operations is a most VISIBLE element in the police's commitment to deny criminals the use of roads and REASSURE THE PUBLIC that they are safe and that the law is being upheld.

MARITIME POLICING

7.26 The National Coast Guard Service is the major provider of a host of enforcement and inspection resources in Belize's coastal waters. The BDF also employs its Boast Squadron when necessary while the BPD maintains small crafts at all major seaport towns. The Coast Guard does not have the capacity to patrol Belize's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to protect fisheries and other interests. It is understood that this will be corrected soon.

AERONAUTICAL POLICING

7.27 Neither the military nor police have a rotary wing aircraft. This is a major deficiency in the operational assets of both organizations and it is recommended that one be acquired soon. The BPD can however rent such aircraft when justified. The time between various decisions and being airbourne often contribute to failed policing objectives. The BDF Air Wing has 3 fixed wing aircrafts each of which are fairly old with low cruising speeds. These should be gradually replaced.

7.28 The US Government operates a radar and communication based Cooperating Nations Information Exchange System (CNIES) within the region which includes Belize. Information on suspect or illegal entry of aircrafts into Belize airspace is received. Belize's response to fast moving aircraft is limited and the radars' capacity is somewhat degraded during nighttime.

DEPLOYMENT OF BDF

As presently arranged, the Defense Act leaves it open for any government of the day to deploy the BDF for partisan political purposes.

87. Without restricting legitimate aims it is recommended that Defense Board Regulations include protocols for deploying the military (excluding states of emergencies) in aid of the Civil Power under the heading Military Aid To The Civil Power (MACP) and Military Aid To The Civil Ministry (MACM). These arrangements are in place in the UK, Canada and other parliamentary democracies. It helps to avoid embroiling the military in political controversies.

CONFRONTING TERRORISM

7.29 The BPD, BDF and SB all have various plans and resource configuration to confront the threat of terrorism action against the nation.

7.30 The shortcoming is the absence of protocols which distributes an authority structure and various operational support responsibilities and cooperation between these and other related agencies.

88. It is recommended;

- ***That such an operational and coordinative protocol be created and annual drills instituted. The Security Forces Joint Operational Procedures could be amended to include this.***
- ***That the BPD strengthen its transnational links to international and regional anti-terrorism resources and data bases.***
- ***A counter terrorism advisory group at the level of the National Security Council be created.***

TOURISM SAFETY

7.31 The department maintains a Tourism Police Unit which oversees police patrols in tourists' areas. This takes place outside of a specific strategic and policy framework so tourism workers, entrepreneurs, District Officers and Peoples Coalition are not involved in Tourism Area Security plans. There is much that the Tourism Sector can contribute but little will be forthcoming in the absence of a strategic area plan.

89. It is recommended that;

- ***A Strategic Tourism Security Plan be created along with cascaded tactical plans for various areas.***
- ***That tourism interests be embraced in these plans.***
- ***That a working group be created to review and evaluate performance.***

PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT

90. It is recommended that the BPD be more actively engaged in enforcing laws to protect the environment including pollution and the protection of forests and the unique Monuments and Wildlife of Belize. The widespread rural deployment of police staff at small substations and their low activity rates makes them ideally positioned to do so. Such enforcement statistics should be transmitted to the relevant ministries and be published in the Annual Police Reports. This will again improve value for money.

POLICE RECORDS

7.32 The records kept by the Police on arrested/ charged offenders reveal a narrow range of biodata. Since it appears to be true for Belize that 80% of serious crimes are committed by a handful of young repeat offenders, the quality of data collection from arrestees is always helpful in future investigations.

91. It is recommended that current forms used be amended to achieve this.

PROJECTING POLICE SERVICE

7.33 Except when making arrests, few police encounters with citizens are recorded and the few recorded, cannot be found after one or two months. So the hundreds of monthly police/ citizen encounters where the police advise, counsel and caution with a gentle hand are not recorded nor promulgated in annual reports, to the media nor the public.

Consequently the BPD over emphasizes its crime fighting role and down grade its SERVICE FUNCTIONS. It is a wrong impression often created by the police themselves.

92. It is recommended that this data be gathered, stored, promulgated and highlighted as a measure of police performance.

ENFORCEMENT

7.34 The Police are under enforcing;

- Minor street offences
- The offensive weapons provisions of The Crime Control and Criminal Justice Act Cap 102 and
- The Crime and Disorder and Sex Offender provisions of the same Act and.
- The environment laws

The under enforcement of these offences is the gateway to more serious and more offences while a zero tolerance approach leads to a perception of oppression and loss of public trust. (Except for sex offences)

93. It is recommended that;

- ***The paperwork leading to the prosecution of minor cases should be REDUCED AND SIMPLIFIED using computerized pro forma.***
- ***That the balanced prosecution of street offences be pursued.***

- ***Methods be designed to encourage the flow of information from operational staff to A DESIGNATED Inspector in order to start prosecution of certain offences, as required by the Criminal Control and Criminal Justice Act.***

7.35 Many MINOR OFFENDERS and TRAFFIC OFFENDERS are also SERIOUS OFFENDERS some of whom are wanted for questioning about major crimes, so balanced but robust enforcement helps SOLVE SERIOUS CRIMES.

94. It is also recommended that Police Community Service Officers be appointed Special Constable and trained to preserve the peace and increase the flow of relevant information at less cost. (See the recommendation of the CoP)

CRIMINAL STATISTICS

7.36 Criminal statistics is one aspect of Criminal Justice Statistics when integrated with Judicial and Penal Statistics. It is a special form of social statistics.

7.37 Properly collected and analyzed it can contribute significantly to the quality and sustainability of polices supporting National Development. It can help unravel the links between crime and urbanization, education, employment, rural development, family practices and more. When integrated with Judicial and Penal Statistics it can help policy makers, judges, correctional officers and researchers evaluate the effectiveness of different sentences, treatment and rehabilitative approaches for different offenders. Criminal statistics should help create polices to control and prevent crime and deviance, but unfortunately the countries which cannot afford to lose such opportunities are the countries which are losing such opportunities. Belize is one such country.

POLICE PERFORMANCE STATISTICS

7.38 The Criminal Statistical System in the BPD has not been reviewed over the last 30-40 years but CIB forms used to record data of accused were improved about 8 years ago. There however remains much data about victims and accused persons that should be collected to help investigators, crime control and allied policies.

7.39 There is no central statistics unit in the BPD. The Joint Intelligence Coordinating Centre (JICC) is performing this function by default as it cannot be envisaged that the unit coordinating intelligence gathering would be mandated to gather and compile all forms of police statistics.

7.40 There are many data storage points in the department where critical data is being filed away and which are difficult to retrieve. An example is returned case files showing how cases were disposed of. Another is the filing away of unsolved cases which should be reviewed and periodically re-opened for investigations in appropriate cases. Much high

quality data about routine police encounters with citizens and other performance indicators are not being collected, compiled nor published.

7.41 Following is a list of data NOT flowing into JICC for compilation and analysis.

- Incidents where the Police advise, counsel and warn people.
- If complainant or perpetrators are Belizean citizen. If not the country of birth and citizenship.
- The criminal status of perpetrators to include drugs or gang affiliation.
- Deportation status if any.
- In relation to murders, the precise motive (if gang related, robbery, domestic, etc).
- Information in relation to shooting incidents. To specify the motive and type of shooting incident. (i.e. Drive-by, ride-by etc)
- The exact address/ location of crimes.
- Relationship between victim and offender.
- If victim has any antecedent history or affiliation with any group or organization that may be relevant to the crime or has triggered the crime. (i.e. drugs , gang, domestic etc)
- Victim general lifestyle/ characteristic i.e. alcoholic, drug user, does he live alone, etc
- Indication of how the offender gains entry if a crime scene was inside a building. i.e. force entry, let in by victim, public access, through unsecure door/window.
- The full family circumstances and employment history of offenders and victims.

DISAGGREGATION

7.42 The collection and publication of Criminal Statistics are disaggregated primarily by legal categories. As a consequence the serious incidents of illegal shootings and their direct relation to murders and firearms are not collected, recorded nor published in annual statistics because the charge usually laid in such cases are forms of aggravated assaults and this can also consist of cases which do not include shootings.

7.43 The number of cases of violence AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN are not separated nor published. There are many other such examples of unresponsiveness to the concerns of a modernizing society and evolving PUBLIC POLICY NEEDS.

ADJUSTED CRIMINAL STATISTICS

7.44 At the end of each year when police statistics is published, adjusted criminal statistics should also be published showing the number of reported murder cases which were reduced to manslaughter after trial. This would be the adjusted incidence of murder with an adjusted murder rate. This would apply to other cases when there was a finding of guilt only on a lesser offence.

SUMMARY JURISDICTION OFFENCES

7.45 These offences are not being sufficiently disaggregated and published so many important indicators and trends concerning police efficiency and criminality remain hidden. Examples are assaults on the police and assaults by the police, going armed, unauthorized aircraft landing and other serious offences.

95. It is recommended that;

- ***Summary Jurisdiction offences be disaggregated and published.***
- ***The incidence and rates of crimes such as rape, carnal knowledge and assaults against females should also be disaggregated and published. These should be calculated using the female population as the denominator to better indicate risk to this cohort.***

- ***There must be more breakouts of offences against public morality, assaults, offences against the state and against public order.***
- ***The Statistics should include crimes separately cleared up by prosecution, by ARREST and by CONVICTION.***
- ***More victim related data be classified and published.***

- *All rules used for counting and classification be published. Eg. How would one offender who commits 2 robberies in one event or 3 robbers who rob one person be counted.*
- *The police classification of major or serious crime be amended. Presently this category includes minor theft but excludes serious wounding and grievous harm cases. THIS IS MISLEADING.*

7.46 The statistical efforts in the BPD are also undermined by;

- Superficial generalized data unfit for good policy making.
- Unreliability
- Limited capacity for joined up approaches to solving complex policing problems.
- Data discrepancies between storage sites.
- Variation in concept definitions.

96. It is recommended that a Central Criminal Statistics Unit be established, a head be identified and training in the field be provided. This should be merged with judicial and penal statistics to create a Criminal Justice Statistical Unit by 2012.

97. It is recommended that in the meantime the AIDT undertake a major reorganization of the statistical system of the BPD.

DISASTER RECOVERY PLANS

7.47 The department preparedness and recovery plans are centered around hurricanes. For obvious reasons DISASTER RECOVERY plans should be expanded.

98. It is therefore recommended that;

- ***A major POLICE RESUMPTION AND CONTINUITY plan be created for the BPD.***
- ***This should include proactively used offsite storage of critical data in Belmopan.***

- ***Alternative communication, electricity, food, fuel and weapons storage arrangements be in place.***
- ***The most plausible recovery alternatives and the most essential processes be promulgated, reviewed and understood by all members.***

- ***Asset, human and CRITICAL SITE PROTECTION planning for CONTINUED GOVERNANCE, POLICE, MILITARY, MEDICAL and essential services coordination and operations be created.***

- ***These plans provide detailed restorative actions after particular disasters such as accidents to or sabotage of major police assets or unexpected major incidents such as;***
 - ***Hazardous Chemicals; Explosion/ Fire/ Bombings/ Mass poisoning***
 - ***Earthquakes;***
 - ***Terrorists Action including bio-terrorism;***
 - ***Fire/ Arson***
 - ***Riots, Insurrection and Invasions***

POLICE PRECINCTS

7.48 There are plans to divide Belize City into 4 police precincts consisting of 4 full service police stations. Currently there are the Queen Street and the Racoon Street Stations which the latter also serves as the Police Traffic Headquarters. Within Belize City there are also 3 partial service police stations and 10 small single purpose post and booths from which foot patrols are deployed. All these stations with a police staff of 480 serves a city of 63, 700 citizens at a ratio of 1 Police Officer to 133 citizens and 120 Police Officers per urban built up square mile.

99. Considering that full service police stations absorb a large support service staff while a critical policing need in Belize City is to deploy more officers on the streets,

It is recommended INSTEAD that VALUE FOR MONEY BE CONSIDERED and the practice of deploying MORE SINGLE PURPOSE, and store front type police post be continued.

7.49 An example of the extent of support service staff necessary to provide full police service is the Dangriga Police Station with a staff of 40 officers and 4 civilians, being able to deploy only 2-4 police officers on patrol duties on any one shift. This is typical of most district head stations.

100. It is also recommended that in addition to the current multi-purpose station in the Southside, one 40 man SINGLE PURPOSE police/ military patrol base with manned surveillance points and CCTV cameras be strategically located there. This would be more cost effective than the precinct proposal. (Refer to Map 2.1 Cap 2 Murder locations in Belize City)

7.50 This model would enable greater manpower deployment at less cost but with the admitted disadvantage of not providing more full police stations that are more proximately available to citizens. This need is however adequately met in Belize City. This latter method would also make it more cost effective to employ targeted/ directed patrol and surveillance points in the Southside aimed at suppressing and preventing rising crimes of violence and murders. The plan to introduce POLICE PRECINCTS SHOULD BE ABANDONED. The Precincts Plan would cost approximately BZ \$7.75 M while the recommended 40 man post would cost approximately BZ \$2.2 M at a NET SAVING OF APPROXIMATELY BZ \$5.5 M.

DISTRICT CRIME AUDITS

101. It is recommended that the development of a Crime Control Strategy needs to be based on more evidence emerging from neighbourhoods and District Crime and Disorder Audits. This would inform the more accurate design of District Crime Plans and Annual Police Plans.

POLICING/ COMMUNITY CONSULTATIONS

7.51 District Officers must be more active in organizing Police-Community consultation, partnerships and cooperation with the Private Sector, NGO, Small Businesses, Village, Town and City Councils and Faith based organizations.

CONTRACT SECURITY GUARD SERVICE

7.52 This form of private police is expanding in Belize. There are 19 registered contract guard companies and about 33 commercial/ industrial corporate entities which also employ “in house” security guards. There are about 500 registered security guards.

7.53 They are now sharing commercial space with the police in commercial plazas to which the public has access. This and their possession of considerable number of arms and ammunition require that legally available controls be exercised. THIS IS NOT THE CASE IN BELIZE and the following highlights some weaknesses in oversight and control.

- Permitted legal authority to design a syllabus of training for security guards has not been exercised.
- Security Trainers have not been certified.
- The CoP has not exercised and delegated his authority to ensure security guards are adequately trained and certified in the use of firearms.
- There are no inspections and audits of ammunition owned by Security Guard Companies.
- The lone Police Inspector assigned to inspect all guard companies and companies having in-house guards cannot be expected to adequately inspect companies nation-wide.

102. It is within the remit of CoP to correct these inadequacies and it is recommended that this be done.

7.51 Over the last 3 years 14 firearms and 97 live rounds of assorted ammunition have been stolen from security guards. Many are likely to be in the hands of criminals.

103. It is recommended that the Private Security and Investigations Services (Control) Act be amended to impose vicarious liability and a stiff financial penalty/tariff for the loss of firearms by its employees by whatever means. The rationale is the strain on police resources and the threat to public safety.

104. The police make greater effort to encourage security guard companies to install their radios in the police control centre in Belize City and reception areas in District Head Stations, i.e the guard net programme which has petered out to nothing.

105. Qualified road/ visiting supervisions of select security guard companies be encouraged to become Volunteer Special Constables after training at the Police Academy. They cover extensive areas at night and can be a great help to the police.

A CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRAINING INSTITUTE

7.52 Considerations should be given to convert the police academy into a Criminal Justice Training Institute for Police, Immigration and Customs training along with Court Administrators, Prison Officers and Security Guards. This would create economies of scale and be marketable in the Caribbean at a profit. Guard Companies and other agencies should pay a training fee.

POLICE COMMUNICATIONS

7.53 Communication among police staff and between the police and citizens and the media are addressed in Chapter 3.

7.54 The almost obsolete analog communication system used by the BPD is now difficult to maintain due to age and unavailability of parts and equipment. The majority of repeaters are defective and geographic communication coverage is less than adequate. Insufficient hand held radios are available to members on duty.

7.55 Commanders and Special Units were assigned identifying codes for radio use but they are hardly used. Radio usage is generally poor and unprofessional.

106. It is recommended that;

- Due to convergence between communication and information technologies, THE SIGNALS UNIT BE MERGED WITH THE POLICE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY UNIT (PITU) and be renamed Police Information and Communication Technology Resource Unit (PICTRU). This should be done immediately.***

107. A study be conducted to determine the most cost effective option to introduce a digital communication system with national and secure coverage for the BPD along with some form of intra-agency links.

108. Steps be taken by the CoP to improve professional use of police radios.

109. At least 50 hand held radios be repaired and deployed to staff ON ROAD DUTIES.

CONCLUSION

7.56 The AIDT and recommended help from the attachment of two ACP's from Barbados and South Africa acting as Supernumerary ACPs to reorient the strategic, integrative and tactical operational assumptions and technologies necessary for intelligence led interdictive and preventative policing in the BPD. Both countries should be requested to pay the salaries of these officers.

Chapter 8

Terms of Reference:

Review Formal Mechanisms for Social Integration of Policing and Citizens Cooperation and Make Recommendations

8.1 Extended policing partnerships consist of various forms of plural policing; citizens' oversight, sectorial consultations and police outreach programmes which all serve to democratize policing. They provide legitimacy, extend public ownership of and trust in the police and policing. It is a peace building and crime reduction process which improves SOCIAL CAPITAL essential to national development.

SPECIAL CONSTABLES RESERVE/ VOLUNTEER/ ANCILLARIES

110. It is recommended that a National Police Reserve consisting of five groups of 100 Special Constables in five Districts and 200 in Belize District be created. This would serve to embed community responsibility for public safety and provide the Police with additional manpower at less cost during a surge in operations or a major border or unexpected major incident requiring focused military and police resources. An important additional benefit would be to avoid calculating increases in Police manpower needs, based upon periodic mass surge in operations requiring more police officers. This measure would also create a MULTIPLIER EFFECT supporting law and order and deepen democratic forms of policing nation wide.

8.2 The Police Act Sec 37 (1) provides for such a Reserve. The difference between this unit and the BDF Reserve would be that members of the BPD Reserve would all be trained part time Police Officers. They should be paid a stipend during training and when mobilized. Leaders in the private sector should be encouraged to join and provide leadership and support in the BPD Reserve.

111. It is also recommended that;

- ***Paid Special Constables assigned in support of policing functions such as driving, custodial duties etc., should be organized into a POLICE ANCILLARY CORPS.***
- ***They should continue to report to NCO's in whatever formation they serve.***

- ***Members should not be conferred with ranks as this could create enmity in determining precedence between their senior ranks and junior BPD members.***
- ***The existing volunteer Special Constables be expanded into a VOLUNTEER CORPS which should aim to attract staff from the professions of medicine, law, engineering, statistics, university lecturers and government. This would not exclude people from all walks of life and would widen the knowledge resource base available to the police.***

COURTS WARDEN SERVICE

112. It is also recommended that uniformed Special Constables be trained and appointed as court wardens. This would require no more than one month training and would release about 20 police officers nationwide for operational duties. A Sergeant who would still manage security at the Supreme Court could head this Court Warden Service in Belize City.

113. It is recommended that;

- ***Formal mechanisms should provide for feedback from citizens to be used in target setting and performance measurements.***
- ***The police consolidate and deepen partnerships with City, Town and Village Councils; through Citizen's Coalition Committees.***

- *The Police create more FORMALIZED links with NGOs, the private sector and the churches.*
- *The BPD has launched several initiatives to encourage active citizenship. These should be expanded to include programs to work closer with problem families, the aged and the physically challenged.*

ANCILLARY POLICING

8.3 Beside Special Constables, ancillary policing in Belize exists in the form of Transport Police, Municipal Police, Park Officers and Forest Rangers. The activities of the Transport Police will be looked at in Cap 12 on Traffic Policing.

COMPLIMENTARY POLICING

8.4 Complimentary policing exists in the form of CITIZENS ON PATROL GROUPS. The public response has been excellent wherever the programme was launched except in Belize City where more effort is required to galvanize citizens.

114. It is recommended that;

- *Protocols should be created for the recruitment, training, supervision and employment of this form of complimentary Police which should be expanded nationally. Special rules should be developed for members who have firearm licenses and it is recommended that such members only take their firearm on assignment in very exceptional circumstances since serious questions of liability can arise.*

NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH

8.5 There are 12 neighbourhood watch groups in Belize. These are very active in the Northern Districts of Corozal and Orange Walk. Other districts and formation commanders need to take a more active role in establishing this useful form of policing support. Their activities should be re-organized to attract more young people.

115. It is recommended that Watches be expanded to include BUSINESS WATCH in Commercial areas. TOURISM WATCH among Hotel employees in tourist areas; FARMERS WATCH in farming areas and VILLAGE WATCH in small villages. Members should be included in CITIZENS COALITION COMMITTEES.

POLICE COMMUNITY SUPPORT OFFICERS

116. The CoP has made detailed recommendations for the establishment of a corps of Police Community Support Officers. (See Proposed Strategy to Address Serious Crimes in Belize 2/10/07). It is recommended that his proposal be adopted as it is an effective means of devolving ancillary policing tasks thus releasing more Police Officers to concentrate on core functions. It also reduces policing costs. They should be appointed as Special Constables and be residents of and be attached to towns, villages and particular neighbourhoods as part of the Police Ancillary Corps (See p111). This will improve the quality of the relations between neighbourhoods and the police and improve the flow of information.

VISITING COMMITTEES

117. It is recommended that District Visiting Committees chaired by a Justice of The Peace be appointed at all District Head Towns to periodically visit police lockups. (See Para 6 on Human Rights and Custodial Practices) and report to the Minister of National Security once each quarter. They should be made familiar with local law, various international conventions/ Treaties' regarding The Rights of Prisoners acceded to by the government of Belize. The Minister's consolidated report on their activities should be tabled in the Assembly annually. This could be a Sub Committee of Citizen Coalition Groups.

POLICE COMMUNITY LIAISON COMMITTEE

8.6 These were created and are operating in some districts. Others are now defunct due to inattention of District Commanding Officers. It appears that Citizen Coalition Committees will replace these. Transnational studies on these mechanisms suggest that they survive only if they have the force of law and a clear mandate. This is recommended at Cap 6.

SPORTS

8.7 Organized sports in the police department serve many important functions. It keeps participants fit and healthy and maintains morale and esprit – de- corps. It often helps supervisors to identify serious character flaws in members. Well organized sports programmes are one of the many signs of inspiring leadership.

8.8 Despite many and varied national sports competitions in Belize, the police do not have a team entered in any NATIONALLY ORGANIZED COMPETITION. Instead they sometimes participate in local games such as soccer, softball, volleyball and basketball in a loose manner where members organize a team on their own initiative and usually at their own cost.

A sports officer recommended at Cap 11 should correct this shortcoming.

PRIVATE POLICE

8.9 This exists in the form of Contract Security Guard Service and is reported on in more details in Cap 7.

THE CONSCIOUS YOUTH DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (CYDP) AND YOUTH FOR THE FUTURE (YFF)

8.10 These programmes are managed by police and civilian staff. They engage youth and communities at high risk for crime, in a host of activities including job training and placement.

118. It is recommended that;

- The concept of AFFIRMATIVE ACTION EMPLOYMENT be developed and the private sector be encouraged to accept the idea and use it in a structured way to employ graduates of CYDP and YFF.***
- high crime communities be galvanized around programmes which offer community benefits such as a dedicated school bus, sports gears, scholarships, medical assistance etc IN RETURN FOR measured reduction in rates of violent crimes.***

- This programme establishes formal links to the Probation Service, Family Court, Offenders on Community Service Order programme and the Juvenile Custodial Facility.***
- The staff of the programme be increased and more resources be devoted to its activities.***

119. A first offenders program was introduced and later became dormant. It is recommended that this be revisited under the auspices of the CYDP.

120. It is recommended that mechanisms be created to continuously measure the inputs/ outcomes/ performance of these programmes.

Chapter 9

Terms of Reference:

Review The Use of Technology, Physical Resources and Make Recommendations

9.1 The Police Information Technology Unit (PITU) was introduced in the BPD in 1993. The cost of the Technology and other resources devoted to this effort amounts to several million dollars. This investment is INADEQUATELY PROTECTED apparently due to lack of appreciation for the many failures world-wide to integrate IT in police departments. An e-policing policy has not been developed and oversight of IT implementation is lax and is best characterized as management by omission. So the Inspector in command has decided that he and his staff.

“Has identified distinct projects which we will develop in the next 5 years”

(See PITU 5 year action plan developed by the Inspector in charge and his staff)

9.2 The Unit is staffed by an Inspector, a Consultant and 12 additional members. All are committed and dedicated professionals who have solicited old computers cannibalized them and built reliable functioning ones at great saving to the department. They have against difficult odds, built several networks including an efficient email system. At present there are 14 local area networks nationwide, an instant messaging service and a police website. The PITU is installing a CIMS powered by Memex Technology Inc which is a very sophisticated, and widely used centralized data base with a powerful intelligence capability.

9.3 IT can increase the department's capacity to be more strategic, problem oriented, analytical and pro-active but this requires a major shift in management paradigm, and decentralization of both structure and authority. Another required shift is away from case-by-case, retrospective investigation towards prospective intelligence gathering and analysis and from secrecy to information sharing. It is a major challenge to the old patterns of policing and the accumulated storehouse of shared police values and attitudes from the past .i.e **POLICE CULTURE**.

9.4 Information Technology can also be an effective tool for surveillance of supervisory ranks through audits and mediatory “fields” and indices. It also allows for better retrospective control of misconduct. Because of this, its introduction has caused resistance and sabotage in some Police Departments.

9.5 Other common problems associated with the introduction of Information Technology in police departments, include flaws in system design, poor system performance, infrastructure inadequacy, lack of systems integration and various problems allied to Training and Support. Some of these are **ALREADY EVIDENT**.

9.6 IT CAN CONSUME MILLIONS OF DOLLARS while imposing crippling restrictions on modern methods of policing. Without adequate strategic oversight before, during and after implementation it can introduce inappropriate performance measures and give power to the wrong people in the department, since information is a source of power.

9.7 In many police departments where IT has been introduced, it has not created a major impact on policing. In some departments the experience is that it has increased PRODUCTIVITY without improving EFFICIENCY.

9.8 The costing by Memex Inc. of BZ \$3.0 M for complete installation of the system has not been addressed nor prioritized. Officials have been encouraged to address these matters.

9.9 None of these major issues and pitfalls are addressed in addition to the inadequacy of SECURITY OF VITAL POLICE INFORMATION over its network.

It is recommended that;

122. AN E-POLICING STRATEGY be developed IN CONFIRMITY WITH GoB, E. GOVERNMENT's and ICT policies.

123. The CEO Ministry of National Security and CoP appoint a small IT POLICY STEERING GROUP from members of the BPD and other government agencies to guide the introduction of IT into the BPD and formulate priorities, timeliness and a budget.

124. Automated inventory control and audits be implemented in this Unit.

125. A Kleps internet line requested for information security by the Units manager be acquired.

126. The current IT Consultant work with this group.

127. A training plan be developed to coincide with phased implementation of each segment of the system's introduction.

128. Sub committees of user groups from various units in the department work with the policy steering group.

9.10 Matters relating to cyber crime WHICH REQUIRE LEGISLATION are fully addressed in the National Security Strategy and should be considered by the IT Policy Steering Group to help guide the legislative process.

PHYSICAL RESOURCES

9.11 The considerable value of the assets owned, held in trust, possessed or leased by the BPD belies the policies and procedures for their care, use and preservation. Internal audit of property and equipment is done during department wide inspections but these are irregular and infrequent. The central Quartermaster (QM) Stores is not internally audited as the Department's Financial Officer (DFO) cannot spare the staff to go through voluminous paper bound registers and inspect the irregularly mixed and confusing storage arrangements. There are no records for some property in custody of the QM.

129 It is recommended that an inventory software be developed by the PITU for use by the QM Stores and bi-annual INTERNAL AUDITS are conducted.

9.12 The DFO has introduced better controls over procurement procedures in keeping with the law and regulations. The previous systems were lax and led to corrupt practices with respect to certain items including petrol. This item can still be stolen from stock ordered for boats or leaked from vehicles without raising a red flag since the records of petrol, oil, coolant etc consumed and miles done are not made in duplicates which are supposed to be

used for monthly calculations of petrol consumed per mile to VALIDATE petrol vouchers issued and amounts received.

130 It is recommended that Tamper resistant petrol vouchers with detachable stubs be designed to replace invoice/ books.

131 That police vehicle logs use duplicate entries, one of which will be removed monthly and used to calculate petrol, oil etc used and the mileage per gallon. This should be reconciled with petrol oil etc vouchers issued along with preventative maintenance and repairs done.

9.13 Worse yet the department cannot account for approximately 150 vehicles because of poor record keeping. Fraud cannot be ruled out.

SECURITY

9.14 The central police armoury at Police Headquarters, Belmopan is insecure. Someone with a hammer and small saw can remove pieces of wood and gain entry into the outer armoury within 6-8 minutes by “picking” 2 cheap locks. The main section could be entered by merely ‘picking’ another 2 cheap padlocks.

9.15 A night patrol is not posted to secure the isolated parts of the premises at nights. Due to the threats posed, this author has pointed out these deficiencies to the ACP operations who have agreed to correct them.


VEHICLE STORAGE

9.16 Vehicles which are exhibits in police cases are mixed with derelict vehicles in a haphazard manner.

132 It is recommended that premises be identified to store all derelict vehicles for the entire department. This would create opportunities to upgrade the APPEARANCE of police facilities nationwide.

9.17 The monthly cost to repair police vehicles, machinery and the attendant long down time, are high primarily because the BPD does not conduct a Vehicle and machinery Preventative Maintenance Programme.

Graph 9.1 **Vehicle Repair-Average Cost per Vehicle per Year Vehicles for More Than 3 Years Old**



133 It is recommended that a planned preventative maintenance programme be designed and implemented for each vehicle and machinery in the BPD and that greater control be exercised over BATTERIES AND TIRES.

MARKETING THE POLICE

9.18 Many proposals are already directed toward this end but this should include an attractive and standard police sign with motto and coat of arms to be conspicuously positioned at all police stations and a larger one for Police Headquarters. Most police stations could do well with a coat of paint and some flowers. The private sector would help if asked by the Commissioner.

9.19 Senior managers of the BPD have failed to involve the DFO in meetings relating to budgetary and procurement discussions and decisions. This officer is not treated as a necessary part of that process but is left to cope with the consequential implications for the budgetary and procurement matters.

134 It is recommended that the DFO be involved in meetings which focus on budgetary issues. She can be excused when sensitive police matters are to be discussed.

BREACH OF THE PROCUREMENT RULES

9.20 While the nature of the policing will occasionally require emergency procurement outside the formal rules, authorized purchase orders are too frequently disregarded without holding offenders accountable. Procurement malpractices have led to corruption resulting in criminal charges.

135 It is recommended that the CoP hold members accountable for breaching regulations and laws relating to procurement and use of material and

FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION MONTHLY INSPECTIONS RETURNS

9.21 District Officers do not exercise sufficient controls over firearms, ammunition and hand held radios and there are no promulgated guidelines for acquisition use, custody and control of these items.

136 It is recommended that;

- Commanding Officers personally sign and certify monthly, for inspections of firearm, ammunition and police radios at head stations and that commanding NCO's do the same for smaller stations and sub stations.***
- Guidelines be developed and published relating to the acquisition, care, use, custody and accounting for all police assets.***

ENERGY CONSERVATION

9.22 Observation indicates that great savings could accrue from turning off lights not necessary for security.

137 It is recommended that;

- ***At least a Sergeant “double up” as an Energy and Water Conservation Officer for Police Headquarters and all large stations and lower ranks in command at all smaller stations and sub stations.***
- ***Bathrooms and stores be retrofitted with timed switches to turn off automatically after a set duration.***
- ***Energy saving bulbs replace all incandescent bulbs.***
- ***Photovoltaic switches be installed on all lights intended for security.***
- ***The Energy Conservation Officer***
 - a) Conducts a daily inspection for leaking pipes, faucets, valves and water wastage.***
 - b) Monitor and keep a record of all light and water bills before payment is made.***
 - c) Periodically apprise the Commanding Officer of trends in electricity and water consumption.***

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS

9.23 Currently The Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Act is used to determine the culpability of police drivers who meet in traffic accidents.

138 It is recommended that the police tribunals be made familiar with the basic principles used in the law of negligence which requires a higher standard of care in determining culpability.

RECYCLED ENVELOPES

139 It is recommended that address labels be glued to envelopes so that they can be reused several times instead of once.

POLICE RECORDS AND REGISTERS

9.24 The final rollout of the CIMS in Belize City will result in shedding the use of many records and registers. A study will have to be done however to decide on what computerized records will need to be backed up by hardcopy and off site storage and archiving.

TELEPHONE CARDS

9.25 Telephone cards are issued for cell phone use by designated police officers. Recording and controls are a source of continuing problems.

TELEPHONE CALLS

9.26 Telephone calls cost approximately BZ \$3.0M annually. There is much abuse, little controls and no accountability even when staff can easily be held accountable.

140 It is recommended that the PITU introduce voice over IP on the existing internet infrastructure. Bandwidth extension and hardware cost would be about 80% less expensive, saving \$2.4 M annually.

9.27 A business phone or group plan can provide for officers who must have mobile phones until PITU can introduce this element on the communication network.

CONCLUSION

9.28 The per capita cost of the BPD varies between \$80 and \$110 for each Belizean but this is accompanied by little consideration in the department for value for each such dollar spent on policing.

Chapter 10

Terms of Reference:

Review Community Based Policing Practices and Make Recommendations

10.1 There are a few areas of policing in the BPD where there is such a wide gap between intention and achievement. The SSP who manages the CBP Unit gets much lip service and little support from command ranks who appear to have little appreciation for the value of CBP. With the exception of recent initiatives by the Manager of CYDP there has been little or no attempts on the part of the BPD to identify and engage community leaders in neighbourhoods with rising crime rates in Belize City. Yet at the core of community based policing is the philosophy that people deserve input into the policing process IN EXCHANGE for their participation and support.

10.2 Information gleaned from interviews with Senior Police Officers suggest that this task has been FOUND DIFFICULT AND LEFT UNTRIED, rather than TRIED AND FOUND DIFFICULT. Since a central theme of CBP is an active community/ police partnership to eliminate/ reduce criminogenic conditions in NEIGHBOURHOODS, Community BASED Policing in Belize City has not been rolled out after TRYING TO DO THIS FOR 12 YEARS.

10.3 The programme has failed the litmus test in areas of neighbourhood engagement, empowerment and joint problem solving for crime reduction.

10.4 It is significant that the language used in the strategies, plans and annual reports on CBP have eliminated the word BASED so the neighbourhood is not regarded as an essential unit of operations for this new approach. Therefore what is being practiced is COMMUNITY RELATIONS, Police outreach and TRADITIONAL UNIT BEAT POLICING on grids not determined by neighbourhood boundaries in Belize City. This is traditional crime prevention and analysis. There is evidence that this is displacing some street crimes including violent crimes to areas not so patrolled.

10.5 There is also a preventative effect upon would be predators looking for opportunities in crowded commercial areas. The constables deployed on “community policing” duties are under the supervision of Zone Beat Liaison Officers. BRIEFING by CIB or CIU staff before dispatch ARE RARE so they are not provided with vital police data on wanted criminals, stolen vehicles, missing persons or local crime problems. There are no systemized arrangements for them to gather or provide intelligence, nor are there any key performance indicators to assess performance.

10.6 The CBP Unit manages a wide array of productive national police/ citizens partnership programmes. Some of them are declining due to inattention by District Police Command. This includes neighbourhood watches and more unfortunately Police Citizens Liaison Committees, owing to the lack of appreciation for public support on the part of some SPs. The Police Youth Cadet Corps which is another excellent outreach programme has a membership of 831 and is growing.

RECOMMENDATIONS

141. It is recommended that;

- A two weeks training syllabus be designed for CBP Officers which is certifiable and that internal departmental advertisements be done for applicants.***
 - Selection and training be commenced after programme approval.***
-
- The recommended AIDT assist the responsible officer to implement Community BASED Policing principles and practices, after a Senior Officers re-orientation programme. There is nothing wrong with adapting CBP to national circumstances and culture. It must however seek to engage and empower NEIGHBOURHOODS working with extended partnerships to help preserve tranquillity and thereby build social capital for national development.***

- *The Manager CYDP assist in efforts to galvanize neighbourhoods to support CBP.*
- *Sensitization Seminars be arranged for Senior Officers.*

PROBLEM ORIENTED POLICING (POP)

10.7 Besides not practicing CBP, the existing police objectives fail to integrate this approach with POP and Intelligence Led Policing. POP focuses on research, patterned analysis, IT supported scientific measurements, finding solutions and monitoring the results of police action. This method relies on advanced statistical methods, dedicated staff and computer programmes.

INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING

10.8 These two approaches should also be joined up with intelligence led policing which is a method of doing smarter policing. This is usually offender and victim focused and aimed at limiting the activities of volume criminals, dangerous offenders, narco trafficking and gun crimes. The above is a brief and simplified account.

10.9 These approaches are discrete at their cores with important areas of overlapping. It also requires effective coordination and lateral flows of intelligence and information. All these forms exist in nascent forms in the BPD with few and weak pinch points for coordination. The report on Special Branch expands on these processes and their dependence on IT.

142. It is recommended that;

- *Strategies and policies be created, IT programmes and trained staff operationalize and join up CBP to problem oriented and intelligence led police throughout the BPD for more cost effective and practical crime control and prevention measures.*

- *These means of policing be made explicit, developed and joined up to aspects of proven traditional policing methods.*
- *Current criminal statistics and data gathering systems be reviewed and improved BEFORE complete computerization of such data.*
- *The AIDT develops necessary policies and mechanisms and guide the implementation of the above recommendations.*

Chapter 11

Terms of Reference:

Review Officer Safety, Health and Welfare and Make Recommendations

INTRODUCTION

11.1 While the welfare of members is now on management's agenda via the policing plan 2007-10, matters relating to officer safety and health are not. Consequently it is recommended that a policy along with Standard Operational Procedures (SOP) each for health and wellness, sports, welfare and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) be developed and operationalized at all levels in the department.

11.2 Given the poor record of management, relating to the welfare of lower ranks it is unrealistic to expect that each of the welfare related 16 action plans in the 2007-10 plan which require major efforts of managers will -without more- achieve much.

143. It is therefore recommended that a SMALL TASK FORCE co-chaired by the CoP and CEO be created to drive the process of welfare reforms in the Department.

OFFICER SAFETY

144. At least 50 more bullet resistant vests should be made available to the BPD. This would enable all officers entering violence prone areas to be protected.

11.3 The rising incidence of shooting offences and gun related murders makes it necessary to arm the police in Eastern Division with a weapon of intermediary caliber and range. The lethality gap between police .38 and 9mm weapons on one hand and the M16 on the other is too wide. The 300 yards lethal range of the M16 makes it a weapon to be issued to the police in URBAN AREAS, only in very EXCEPTIONAL CASES due to the high potential to inflict unintentional death and injury to innocent citizens. Additionally the 9mm and .38

calibre revolver are at the lower end of the lethality spectrum which deprives the police of some advantage in lethality.

145. It is recommended that about 20-25 weapons of an intermediate caliber be acquired and distributed at Queen Street and Racoon Street Stations and District head stations while a suitable number be also issued to the Anti-Narco and the Special Patrol Units. When working in urban areas in everyday crime fighting, routine use of the M16 will likely, in the future, raise legal questions of the proportionate use of lethal force when innocent citizens are killed or injured, especially when it cannot be proven that high caliber weapons were being used by criminals.

146. It is recommended that all members be annually recertified in the use of ALL WEAPONS AND IN FIRST AID TO THE INJURED, that such records be kept and that TASERS and MODERN BATONS be commissioned.

POLICE EQUIPMENT

11.4 It is noticed that batons, handcuffs and whistles which are standard police issue are not being carried on duty as often as should be the case. This is due to a breakdown in supervision by middle ranks.

147. It is recommended as a short run measure that all operations staff take action to institute adequate briefing and inspection of all ranks going on and returning off duty.

THE POLICE ASSOCIATION/ POLICE WELFARE

11.5 The establishment of a Police Association is permitted under Part V Sec 34 (1) of the Police Act Cap 138 (Subsidiary Laws of Belize) and the rules for its formation and operation has been made but it remains in abeyance. There is no need to reiterate the critical importance of this association to the government, suffice it to say, that steps should be fast

tracked to create it. Its prolonged absence will foster an unhealthy state of relations between junior and senior ranks, and between the police and government. It is understood that tentative steps have already been taken but greater priority must be given to this process by the Commissioner.

148. There are proposals to have this association also represent the Senior Officers. This would be a mistake and a departure from the existing model of separate representative bodies in the British Commonwealth and the UK. It has been often shown that in the event of withdrawal of service via mass sick outs, the Senior Officers Corps along with Special Constables are the last resorts available to give general law enforcement legality to the actions of the military acting under police command outside of a state of emergency.

149. The government should adequately insure all ranks against death or serious disability suffered IN THE EXECUTION OF DUTY. The amounts should be negotiated and a percentage of premiums paid by members. The volume should make the overall cost attractive.

INSURANCE – DEATH AND DISABILITY

11.6 Alternately the government could contribute to the present WELFARE FUND Cap 138 Part IV Sec 33 (1) of the Police Act to include Commissioned ranks.

11.7 Another option would be self insurance operated from an established fund supported by government and members' contribution within the provisions of the Trust Fund under Sec 53 (1) of the same ACT.

SPORTS AND WELFARE

11.8 Section 33(1) of the Act should be amended to enable a small compulsory contribution by all members to a sports fund to provide for an active sports programme in the BPD.

150. In the short run, it is recommended that voluntary contribution from members and an active sports programme should be created. Currently the BPD hardly engages the wider sports fraternity both to build healthy community relations and healthy rounded character of members. Given the size of the department the BPD should be at the forefront in some of the popular sports in Belize.

The image of sports prowess is important as it portrays a healthy progressive and dynamic organization capable of being an attractive career choice of young people.

COMMISSARY AND CANTEENS

151. In order to cushion the impact of RISING FOOD PRICES and improve the standard of living of members, it is recommended that a CENTRAL COMMISSARY legally provided for in the Police Act be established in Belize City with small branches in each District. These commissaries would supply members and canteen concessionaries at lower prices. Canteen operators should be outsourced and be contracted to supply meals and refreshments to members including the Academy. It would be essential to use paid civilian staff to manage these commissaries and for police vehicles to resupply branch commissaries to keep prices low.

152. It is recommended that the Welfare Task Force establish a plan of action with timelines and Select Private Sector companies encouraged to guide, advise and participate in this endeavour.

SAFETY AND PROTECTION

It is recommended that a Safety and Fire Protection Plan for the BPD be created. In the meantime as a short run measure it is recommended that;

153. Adequate signage be posted indicating evacuation routes from buildings.

154. First action in case of fire, bomb threats or earthquakes be posted.

155. Assembly areas be identified for every police facility.

156. Police buildings must be equipped with fire alarms, sprinklers and fire hoses.

157. The programme of recharging fire extinguishes be better managed.

11.9 HIV/AIDS is a health problem with serious implications for National Development. It should be a serious workplace issue in the BPD.

158. It is recommended that the BPD revise their 2005 HIV/AIDS workplace policy and guidelines as police officers need to be better protected in the face of special occupational risks. This should be in keeping the newly revised framework of the General Principles of the HIV/AIDS Policies of the Belize Public Service. (2008)

SPIRITUAL NEEDS

11.10 Managers of the BPD need to devote more attention to the spiritual needs, mental health, counseling and guidance of members.

159. It is recommended that;

- A BPD chaplain be appointed for each district formation and conferred with the Honourary rank of SP (include in the Draft Conditions of Service Regulations) and that he/ she conducts periodic denominational church service for staff, families, friends and the community at various churches.***
- That as many of the chaplains chosen be qualified psychologists who can provide guidance to members under mental stress and in the recruiting process.***

TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

11.11 A comprehensive discussion paper on the Terms and Conditions of Service members has been prepared.

160. Officials and members representatives should meet and find common ground for representation to the Financial Secretary so a Cabinet submission can be prepared.

BUILDINGS AND LIVING CONDITIONS

11.12 Many police stations and substations are in such a state of disrepair as to be unfit for human habitation. Some lack the simplest amenities making it appear as if no one cares.

11.13 As the GoB launches its housing programme for the very poor it should bear in mind that some isolated police sub stations which house policemen and their families are in no better condition than those of the very poor. At some of these sub stations policemen are forced to live in solitude because they refuse to subject their loved ones to such sub-human conditions. They are among the UNSUNG HEROES OF BELIZE who maintain order in the desolate outposts of the nation.

161. If funds cannot be found to repair some of these substations and all kitchen, bathroom and sleeping facilities, especially in the Stann Creek and Toledo Districts, it is recommended that they be closed.

Chapter 12

Terms of Reference:

To Review Traffic Control and Accident Prevention and Make Recommendations

ROAD POLICING MANDATE

12.1 Like most Police Traffic Branches worldwide, the Branch while enforcing the Road Traffic Laws, have LOST SIGHT OF ITS MANDATE TO DENY CRIMINALS THE USE OF THE ROAD so there is very little liaison with and information flow from CIB about relevant and sometimes hot information about crime and criminals. In view of the impact of increasing crimes of violence and other threats to the nation by criminals who MUST use the roads, this is a WASTE OF VITAL RESOURCE.

12.2 More so that information about traffic offenders is to be viewed as important data for the CIB since researched information worldwide have shown significant links between certain traffic violators and criminal offending (Willet et al). This is very likely to be the case in Belize as has been proven elsewhere.

TRAFFIC PLANS

12.3 The BPD Traffic Department has an ambitious and comprehensive plan to reduce traffic accidents and educate the public about salient traffic issues. The number of traffic accidents and fatalities for the three year period 2005-07 has been lower than the preceding three year 2002-04 and the ratio of prosecution and arrest to accidents for any year is about 1 to 1 which appears to be good since fixed penalty tickets data was not received from all the authorities issuing these. See Graph 12.1 Below

12.4 Nonetheless senior managers need to implement simple procedures to ensure that fixed penalty tickets are available to all members of the BPD. As a matter of practice, the Transport Department sends printed tickets to the Police Traffic Department in Belize City

only. Many other districts do not receive these tickets so this activity is not national in scope and is therefore ineffective.


12.5 The Police Traffic Department has been without radar guns for one year. It has one obsolete breathanalyser, the evidence from which is not accepted in the courts.

162. It is recommended that three modern radar guns be acquired along with three breathanalyser units.

Graph 12.1 Select Traffic Statistics



Graph 12.2 Fatal and Injury Accidents



THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT

12.6 The Department of Transport is conferred with a wide legal mandate to regulate and control all aspects of traffic and transport. A number of weaknesses in their enabling legislation Cap 230 which impacts upon traffic policing are evident.

12.7 Ticketing penalties do not include the loss of points for select offences which over time could lead to drivers' license suspension.

12.8 There is no separate drivers' licensing regime for drivers and vehicles transporting hazardous material on roadways.

12.9 The absence of IT in the department makes it difficult to provide the police with vital information in real time.

12.10 The Transport Department sends traffic ticket books only to police formations which request them, SO OVER 70% OF ALL BPD members are NOT ENGAGED in this form of enforcement which is intended to help reduce fatalities and accidents.

12.11 There is no organized system in place for all courts to transmit information about suspension of drivers' license to the Transport Department.

12.12 There are concerns about corrupt practices in the department that should be confronted. City and Town Councils will soon have greater responsibility for traffic affairs within their jurisdictions so it is recommended that the weakness identified are corrected early.

163. It is recommended that;

- ***A small study be done to formulate a programme of modernization of the Transport Department***
 - ***The Road Motor Vehicles and Traffic Act be revised.***
-
- ***Coordinative mechanisms be developed for greater cooperation and information sharing between the Transport Department, The Police and City Councils.***
 - ***A Centralized Traffic Statistics Unit be created.***

12.13 Some of the many considerations for the study recommended above would be what aspects of the Departments operations could be economically outsourced to qualified individuals and to create more DIFFERENTIATED CATEGORIES of motor vehicles, PUBLIC PASSENGER VEHICLES and drivers licenses in the interest of SAFETY.

ROAD SAFETY

164. It is recommended that;

a) The Road Safety Programme be expanded and more data collection and analysis be undertaken to inform this programme.

b) A TRAFFIC ENGINEER be located in the Ministry of Works to work closely with and advise the Police on the various aspects of enforcement, flow, safety and analysis of traffic related matters. An IT programme would be critical.

c) Greater variations of speed limits be established and imposed by law.

d) Hard shoulder “pull off” into bus stops especially on highways be constructed. BUSES STOPPING PARTIALLY ON HIGHWAYS along with speeding have been the CAUSE OF MANY SERIOUS ACCIDENTS.

e) More detailed traffic warning signs and flashing amber signals be constructed at various locations on highways.

f) More frequent campaigns be launched against speeding, drunken driving and not using seatbelts.

g) Radar guns be acquired and deployed.

h) The Police order, issue and control traffic tickets books and this aspect be computerized early.

i) At least 4 more traffic motor cycles be acquired.

j) The support staff of the Police Traffic Branch be civilianized and increased by 10 more police officers.

165. It is also recommended that a programme of training be organized for the Traffic Department to sensitize them to issues of crime control and to create organized communication and information flow between the department and CIB, CIU and the ADU.

12.13 The collection of Traffic Statistics by the department is underdeveloped and not subjected to periodic reviews. The department is not abreast with advancing knowledge about accident causation, prevention, safety and investigation.

12.14 The Traffic Engineer already recommended would play a major role on upgrading Traffic Statistics and Safety Programmes. Presently the results of the breathanalyser are not of the standard sufficient to be accepted by the Courts, so initial results can only lead the police to adopt the CUMBERSOME APPROACH OF MEDICAL VERIFICATION.

166. It is recommended that three modern breathanalyser be acquired with three initial testers which should be strategically located.

Conclusion

Over the last 7 years, the managers have adopted an ambitious programme of modernization. This has led to a plethora of strategies, policies, action plans and targets, the magnitude of which has overwhelmed the managerial and technological competences of a large part of the Senior Officers Corps. This has created a wide gap between articulated aspirations and actual service delivery. Two unfortunate consequence of this failure are an evolving managerial culture within which rhetoric, symbolic manipulation and scapegoating have become commonplace. The second and more obvious one is a crumbling structure of managed police service delivery as senior officers turn inwards, focusing on traditional administration paralleled by low levels of accountability and delegation encompassed by inspiring leadership and increasing corrupt practices.

THE AUDIT IMPLEMENTATION AND DEVELOPMENT TEAM-MEMBERSHIP AND MANDATE

167. This team should be comprised of two senior police officers of the BPD as resource persons and a police advisor. The CEO MNS and the CoP should be co-chairmen. Its mandate should be to strengthen the institutional capacity of the BPD as approved by the GOB along with an authorized action plan and timelines. OVER 90% of recommended REORGANIZATION WILL NOT REQUIRE ADDITIONAL EXPENDITURE and some will RESULT IN NET SAVINGS. This project will take about 12-18 months.

THE WAY FORWARD

The recommendations in this review offer a path to transform the BPD into an ethic based and professional police department capable of meeting public expectation for a safe and secure future. The climate and the need for change exist and it is hoped that the GoB will decide and approve the way forward along the course suggested in this review. A recommended action plan with timelines and estimated cost is at Appendix 1B.

BACKGROUND AND TERMS OF REFERENCE

This consultant was contracted to conduct a review of the Belize Police Department commencing on 2nd June 2008 and ending on 30th November. The Terms of Reference (TOR) are at Appendix 1A. A report on Special Branch has been submitted separately.

METHODS OF ENQUIRY

Policing Strategies, Policies and Standing Orders were examined to see how well these translated into desired action/ compliance at the tactical levels. Military/ Public and Police Officers along with many key actors/ stakeholders were interviewed to get an historical insight into opinions, expectations/ intent/ challenges and the background to the processes underlying the development of present policing policies.

Many Heads of Department were interviewed several times and both announced and unannounced inspections carried out. Police records, along with record keeping and statistical practices were examined in detail. The Constitution, criminal laws and hundreds of reports, policies and orders were carefully read.

The opinions and expectations of the public were gleaned by personal field trips and Town Hall meetings convened by the Minister of National Security in various Districts.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The kindness and hospitality of Belizeans contributed to a unique and heart warming experience. Citizens even in the most remote areas knew of my task and expressed their HOPE and aspirations for an improved police service which can better contribute to their safety, prosperity and quality of life.

The Minister of National Security, his Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and the Commissioner of Police (CoP) were always available to clarify, assist and provide necessary resources for my task.

Special thanks to my resource team of Superintendent Elodio Aragon, Assistant Superintendent Marlon Allen and Executive Secretary Phylcia Williams all of whom sometimes toiled away in the night.

I must also extend my gratitude to the many NGOs and a robust and aggressive media which were always sources of many valuable insights.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

The Guiding Principles underlying this review are to honestly and objectively evaluate the weaknesses and strengths within the Belize Police Department and to propose changes which will help transform the police and policing to ethically and justly enforce the laws in keeping with public expectations; to protect human rights, persons and property and to preserve public tranquility, thereby contributing to national development.

Harold Crooks
Police Consultant
Ministry of National Security,
Belmopan
Belize, C.A.
November 2008

GLOSSARY

ACP	- Assistant Commissioner of Police
ADU	- Anti-Drug Unit
AIDT	- Audit Implementation and Development Team
ASP	- Assistant Superintendent
BAHA	- Belize Agricultural Health Authority
BATFE	- Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
BDF	- Belize Defense Force
BPD	- Belize Police Department
CBP	- Community Based Policing
CEO	- Chief Executive Officer
CHIS	- Covert Human Intelligence Sources
CIB	- Crime Investigation Branch
CIMS	- Crime Information Management System
CIU	- Criminal Intelligence Unit
CNIES	- Cooperating Nations Information Exchange System
CO	- Commissioned Officers
CoP	- Commissioner of Police
CPI	- Corruption Perception Index
CSO	- Community Support Officers
CYDP	- Conscious Youth Development Programme
DCA	- Deep Covert Agent
DCP	- Deputy Commissioner of Police
DEA	- Drug Enforcement Administration
DFO	- Department's Financial Officer
DPP	- Director of Public Prosecution
EEZ	- Exclusive Economic Zone
FIU	- Financial Intelligence Unit
GoB	- Government of Belize
HRD	- Human Resource Development
IAD	- Internal Affairs Division
IT	- Information Technology
JICC	- Joint Intelligence Coordinating Center
KPI	- Key Performance Indicators
MACM	- Military Aid to the Civil Ministry
MACP	- Military Aid to the Civil Power
MNS	- Ministry of National Security
NCIB	- National Criminal Investigation Branch
NCO	- Non-Commissioned Officers
NGO	- Non- Governmental Organization
NSS	- National Security Strategy
NTB	- National Traffic Branch
PICTRU	- Police Information and Communication Technology Resource Unit
PITU	- Police Information Technology Unit
POP	- Problem Oriented Policing

PPE	- Personal Protective Equipment
QM	- Quartermaster
SB	- Special Branch
SOP	- Standard Operational Procedures
SP	- Superintendent of Police
Sp. Cons.	- Special Constables
SSP	- Senior Superintendent
SPU	- Special Patrol Unit
TOR	- Terms of Reference
UB	- University of Belize
YFF	- Youth for the Future

CONFIDENTIAL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The contents of this document are confidential and belong to the Government of Belize. It shall not be reproduced without written authorization of the Minister of National Security.

FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC SAFETY STRATEGIES BELIZE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Policing and Investigation

- Reorganize the NCIB
- Target Organized Crime/ Narco Trafficking.
- Retrain Detectives
- Cross link criminal intelligence and SB data base.
- Enhance patrol strategies.
- Improve inter-agency cooperation and anti-terrorism protocols.
- Rationalize Road Policing

Training, Learning and Culture

- Introduce Police recruit Internship programme.
- Appoint Civilian Director of Academic Studies.
- Do needs analysis and reform all syllabi.
- Reform In-service Training.
- Structure accelerated promotion schemes.
- Emphasize self discipline and ethics.

Leadership and Management

- Introduce Career path and development strategies.
- Target Strategic and Leadership Training Courses.
- Create 360 degree leadership training circles/ seminars, police/military/ public servants/ private sector.

Organizational Capacity Building

- Realign Departmental Structures.
- Delayer SSP and Corporal by attrition.
- Establish Districts as Basic Command Unit with primacy of Command.
- Acquire Investigative/ Communication Technologies.
- Reform Human Resources and Development efforts.
- Improve physical infrastructure.

Police Service Delivery and Ethics

- Move Senior Ranks closer to field supervision.
- Improve Investigative Capacity of Ombudsman.
- Create Professional Standards and Community Relations Divisions.
- Create SOP for Humane Treatment and Safe Custody of Prisoners.
- Create Anti-Corruption Unit.

Anti –Narco and Organized Crime

- Create Anti Narco Intelligence Unit.
- Create collaborative mechanisms between FIU, Tax Department etc.
- Create Surveillance Team.
- Extend Anti-Narco Transnational cooperative links.

Policy and Legislation

- Create mechanisms to establish policing policies and hold CoP accountable.
- Introduce Omnibus Crime Control and Prevention Act to increase interdiction.
- Put all Senior Officers on Performance Contracts of specific duration.
- Civilianize police ancillary tasks

Public Order and Social Integration

- Reduce some military involvement in policing
- Add BDF staff to SPU, retrain, reequip, redeploy.
- Create Police Reserve.
- Expand Sp. Cons. Volunteer Corps.
- Expand outreach programmes.

Information and Communication

- Merge IT and Communication Technologies.
- Create strategic oversight and priorities for roll out of IT.
- Accelerate IT Training.
- Establish E. policing Policy
- Improve Communication Infrastructure.

NATIONAL CRIME INVESTIGATIONS

Summary of Findings

- a) The National Crime Investigation Branch (NCIB) lacks the infrastructural capacity to investigate and interdict complex organized crime and dangerous criminals.
- b) The mechanisms and processes for intelligence led policing are absent.
- c) Too much NCIB effort is focused upon investigating lower level crimes which could be done by the uniformed branch.
- d) The Major Crime Unit has little links with the FIU and Customs; no links with the Income Tax Department nor Social Security. There is no Surveillance Unit within the entire BPD.
- e) Despite the high importance accorded to Anti-Narcotic policing there is no Anti-Narco Intelligence Unit. The Anti-Drug Unit is a uniformed patrol and interdictive unit and unsuited to intelligence gathering.
- f) The NCIB remains unsupported by proactive data mining from other important agencies; by intra-departmental, inter-agency coordinative mechanisms, intelligence gathering and proactive analysis.
- g) Investigators use obsolete case files preparation methods and rely primarily upon generally weak Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS); ex post facto interviewing and inadequate forensics (no DNA or ballistics ID for scenes of crime).
- h) The uniformed formations which are a rich source of criminal data and intelligence are not co-opted into the investigative process.
- i) Oversight of the quality of investigations is weak and transportation for investigators inadequate.
- j) Much unrecognized criminal bio-data remains hidden in files and difficult to retrieve.
- k) There are no formal mechanisms to periodically re-open serious cases.
- l) On the job training is sporadic and lacks structure.

1. An Audit Implementation and Development Team (AIDT) completely recognize the NCIB.

Summary of Recommendations

It should begin with the following measures.

1. Deploy Anti-Narco Intelligence staff nationally. Assurance exists from DEA to house staff if request made.

2. Minister of National Security and CEO to convene meeting with the Responsible Ministers and Head of FIU, Social Security, Customs and Commissioner of Income Tax etc to establish coordinative mechanisms with Major Crimes Investigative Unit.

3. Create, equip and train a surveillance team.

4. Hasten the roll out of the Crime Information Management System.

5. Coordinate with SB to organize the Memex Criminal Intelligence Manager Database.

6. Re-open select unsolved and nolle pros serious crime cases.

7. Ministry of National Security and CEO to meet with DPP to develop protocols for cooperation and closer consultation between police and prosecutors.

8. Create reporting systems for uniformed branch to routinely supply intelligence/ information to NCIB.

9. Continue to polygraph key members of NCIB staff.

10. Assign investigations list of less serious offences to a unit of uniformed staff.

11. Appoint a select senior investigator as trainer and ETHICS OFFICER in addition to ensuring a balanced investigative workload among staff.

12. Reorganize case file preparation and format to include a detailed diary of work done each day.

13. Design more rigorous, personality and ethical screening test for selection of NCIB applicants.

14. Enact regulations for higher pay grades for detectives and crime technicians based upon ACCREDITED certifications and performance.

15. Design and start a series of intense 40 hour modular detective training courses.

PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF CRIME AND POLICE OPERATION

Summary of Findings

- a) The legal regime for controlling and reducing crime and criminogenic condition is too underdeveloped to meet current challenges.
- b) Structural arrangements and deployment of manpower resources are not adjusted to confront new challenges, so much of the police proposals are for MORE resources and less for CHANGE.
- c) Available intelligence and information are of low quality, usually aimed at low level criminal operatives and relatively unavailable to junior uniformed ranks who play little part in garnering these resources.
- d) Much vital criminal statistics are filed away without disaggregation while a wide range of available criminal biodata remains uncollected due to outdated forms which guide data collection.
- e) Basic information technology is being introduced too slowly.
- f) Road policing is wastefully fragmented and CONCEPTUALLY UNDEFINED as an operational mode.
- g) The deployment of the BDF is too susceptible to partisan political manipulation.
- h) Ancillary forms of policing are disorganized and far below the potential for supporting the mechanisms for informal social control and police interdiction.
- i) Data are not collected to measure the cost of operational and manpower resource inputs along with outcomes and impact.
- j) Legally mandated controls over security guard companies are not exercised.

- k) Policing operational techniques are not measured, reviewed nor assessed.
- l) Present levels of saturation patrols of Belize City Southside are unsustainable so an array of more effective crime attack techniques will have to be employed to suppress the murder rate.
- m) There are no specifically designed protocols for some specific terrorist action outside of a narrow range of incidents provided for in the Belize Security Forces Joint Operational Procedures.
- n) There are neither strategic plans nor related policies for Tourism Security so the protective framework is purely tactical.

Summary of Recommendations

A comprehensive crime prevention and control strategy be developed and cascaded to police encounters in the field.

An improved legislative regime, such as an Omnibus Crime Control and Prevention Act enabling more effective preventative/ interdictive control measures to legislate for;

- ***Improved police interdictive and prosecutorial capacities.***
- ***Coordinative and crime prevention community partnerships to include Local Government, Citizens' Coalition Committees and Private Sector Organizations.***
- ***Out of Court Diversion programmes and fixed penalty tickets for minor offences.***
- ***A wider range of custodial and non-custodial sentencing disposals with crime reduction objectives.***

Expand the range of crime attack patrol tactics and target hardening measures.

Increase the flow of criminal intelligence and information on criminal activities between NCIB and the uniformed elements of the Department.

Disband the ADU and create an Anti-Narco Intelligence Unit for deployment nation-wide. Some disbanded staff to supplement a short staffed SPU and be nucleus for anti-narco interdiction.

Amend the Belize Security Forces Joint Operational Procedures to include protocols to confront organized terrorist attacks not provided for along with an ANTI-TERRORISM ADVISORY GROUP.

Create a Strategic and Policy Framework for Tourism Security involving tourism interest.

Create a Road Police Unit to integrate Road Policing Activities.

Provide multi-skill training for Traffic Department to interdict narco-trafficking and serious crimes.

Create protocols for BDF deployment to avoid partisan controversies about deployment.

Review forms relating to crime and criminals to increase biodata capture.

Audit Implementation and Development Team to;

- Completely reorganize criminal and police performance statistical systems.*
- Prepare Police Resumption and Continuity Plan after major disruptive event.*

CoP to exercise control over Security Guard companies as legally required.

Request one ACP from Barbados and South Africa to assist the Audit Implementation and Development Team to strengthen the managerial and operational capacities of the BPD.

Precinct proposal to be abandoned in favour of more focused single purpose deployment of police/ military patrol base in Southside, Belize City.

Summary of Findings

- a) There are insufficient mechanisms enabling the GoB to exercise oversight of police compliance with public safety policies, Policing Standards and Performance.
- b) The focus of management is upon general administration of traditional processes and directives and less on strategic management, leadership, effective controls, accountability, change and development.
- c) Systems and procedures for performance standards, evaluation and promotion are underdeveloped, highly subjective; deviates from certain legal requirements and is a source of low staff morale.
- d) Inspections and departmental performance review are infrequent, irregular and ineffective.
- e) Supervision among Corporals is sub-standard but more effective among Sergeants and Inspectors.
- f) Methods of internal communication discourage upward or lateral flows of ideas and suggestions, causing mass exclusion of the largest cognitive resource of the department.
- g) The tall hierarchy of 10 ranks has distanced the senior and more experienced ranks from the management of critical police service delivery in the field and towards administrative functions which should be delegated.
- h) Senior staff of the department is performing too many auxiliary policing functions in disregard of value for money and best practices.
- i) Training and education in strategic management and leadership have been neglected in favour of short technical courses through Technical Assistance Programmes.
- j) The widespread rhetoric of modernization is paralleled by deteriorating police service delivery highlighted throughout this report.

Summary of Recommendations

In keeping with the Constitutional responsibility of the Cabinet for ensuring public safety it is recommended that a NATIONAL POLICING POLICY AND STANDARDS BOARD be established within the Ministry of National Security. Its mandate would be to;

- Formulate a specific National Policing Performance Framework by which the CoP is held accountable.*
- Advise the CEO on the development of National Security policies.*
- Identify key issues and priorities concerning all policy matters relating to National Security.*
- Provide expert strategic advice, papers, briefings and support to the CEO.*
- Advise and act as liaison on any matter the CEO or Minister may require.*

It is also recommended that a POLICE INSPECTORATE BOARD be created and staffed by sectorial and community groups, the Auditor General and an Inspector General who would monitor;

- Policing policy implementation and performance standards.*
- Leadership, management and strategic oversight.*
- Human Resources Development and conduct thematic inspection.*

Abolish the ranks of Senior Superintendent and Corporals by attrition; add 3 more ACP, 6 more ASPs, appoint 30 more Sergeants and appoint qualified Constables as Grade II constables. Total saving of BZ \$4.0 M annually.

Increase civilian to sworn staff ratios to 1:4; Volunteer Special Constables to 1:1.5 and paid Special Constables to 1:5.

Provide more annual strategic police management courses at Bramshill, UK, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago, Canada or Mexico prior to promotion to the rank of Superintendent.

Establish the criteria –among others- for a Bachelors Degree for promotion to the rank of Superintendent by 2012.

Appoint a qualified civilian to manage and reorganize the Human Resource Development Unit.

Task the Audit Implementation and Development Team to help strengthen the institutional structure and managerial capacity of the BPD.

Suspend increase to police strength pending manpower needs analysis.

QUALITY OF SERVICE DELIVERY

Summary of Findings

- a) There is an unrecognized crisis of indiscipline among Constables and Corporals. The average non-compliance rate during 2001-07 is about 1 breach to 1 Constable. During 2005-06 the non-compliance rate for corporals was 1:5.
- b) The Internal Affairs Department is sidelined by District managers and too closely involved with the Ombudsman investigations of complaints against the police.
- c) The centralization of efforts by the Ombudsman in Belize City has left the police investigating themselves for complaint against them, thus undermining the rationale for independent civilian review.
- d) Statistics of complaints against the police and in-house police indiscipline conceals many critical issues from the public such as how cases are disposed of, along with data for feed back, review and assessment by police managers.

- e) Press Relations is passive and reactive and therefore driven by events and the media which often puts the police on the defensive.
- f) Routine service delivery relating to everyday encounters in the field is unsupervised, sub-standard, mostly undocumented and under-reported.
- g) Supervision of ethical behaviour and self discipline of staff are subjected to a cavalier and laissez faire approach by managers and supervisors.
- h) Police corruption is becoming widespread and networked with other government agencies and the private sector.
- i) The Draft Conditions of Services Regulations will institutionalize too many negative features of Colonial policing Practices.

Summary of Recommendations

Inspectors and Sergeants be deployed to supervise, police service delivery in the field and at reception rooms at stations.

Senior Officers delegate more routine administrative matters, lead and spend more time in the field supervising lower ranks.

A patrol capacity strengthening plan be developed to include new professional patrol and interdictive tactics and training.

Radio communication be used to provide constant oversight and guidance during police field encounters.

The mandate of Internal Affairs Department be widened and converted to a PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS DIVISION under the direction of a SP to oversee conformity with professional standards, improved service delivery and best practices.

This new department defers the investigation of citizen's complaints to the Ombudsman or other Civilian Oversight Authority.

A COMMUNITY RELATIONS DEPARTMENT be created to manage outreach programmes and project police service as a PUBLIC GOOD.

The police shift the projection of their core function away from crime

The BPD conforms to Humane Treaty standards relating to the custody and treatment of prisoners. Develop SOP on Humane Treatment and Custody of Prisoners and enforce same.

Implement a wide array of measures and rituals to embed ethical and inner directed behaviour among staff.

An Anti-Corruption Unit be created and the National Assembly adopt measures legally provided for to apply the Provisions of the Corruption Act to all Public Officers.

The Audit Implementation and Development Team (AIDT) review the Draft Conditions of Service Regulations to ensure equity, professional standards and the principles of Restorative Justice.

SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF POLICING

Summary of Findings

- a) Belize does not have a Rural Constabulary with district/ neighbourhood resident constables acting as non uniformed, civil surrogates for the uniformed police in communities. Special Constables are rarely assigned to this role.
- b) The absence of a National Police Reserve creates a national security vacuum filled during operational surges, only by the BPD Reserves and a few Special Constables who are unfamiliar with police procedures and dependent on a police presence which might be unavailable.

- c) Police lockups and custodial practices are not subject to community oversight.
- d) Neighbourhood Watches are declining as are police/ citizens liaison committees.
- e) Special Constables are organized as volunteer reserves. Some are paid to perform auxiliary policing tasks while civilian groups in some districts are organized as Citizens on Patrol in support of the police.

Summary of Recommendations

- 1. A Police Reserve permitted under the police Act be established.***
- 2. A volunteer corps of special Constables consisting of people from the Professions be organized.***

- 3. Existing paid Special Constables be organized into an Auxiliary Corps.***
- 4. Another group of Special Constables be trained and appointed as Community Support Officers (CSO) RESIDING and working in neighbourhoods and villages to create linkages between the BPD and Communities.***

- 5. Lay Visiting Committees chaired by a Justice of the Peace be created to visit and inspect police lockups and report on conditions and custodial practices.***
- 6. Provide legal basis for and establish formal links with Citizen Coalition Committees, CYDP, YFF, Community Based Policing Officers and NGOs to deepen integration of policing with communities.***

- 7. Ensure that police lockups be made more secure and sanitary.***

USE OF FORCE

Summary of Findings

- a) The BPD Use of Force Policy is a poor guide to police officers. It does not highlight the principle of proportionality nor Belizean and Caribbean case law, international conventions on Human Rights along with practical examples to guide police action.
- b) Police lockups are insecure, insanitary and maintained in breach of human rights conventions to which Belize is a party.
- c) Police orders on bail are often disregarded without consequences.
- d) Prisoners are interviewed by investigating offices with no supervision.
- e) Firearms, ammunition and related records and audits are not managed by District Officers.

Summary of Recommendations

It is recommended that a revised USE OF FORCE POLICY be prepared to;

1. Set out the basic principles in relation to the selection, testing, acquisition and use of firearms and less lethal weapons by police;

2. Provide a statement on standards of competence, accreditation and operational practice relating to police use of firearms and less lethal weapons;

3. Ensure that observance of these principles, and the standards for implementation, results in a systematic programme of continuous development of police policy, practice and capability;

4. Promote compatibility of operating procedures for such weapons, in order to support procedures for testing and maintaining standards of competence, to support operations.

5. Foster the identification and promulgation of good practice and encourage and support the continuing development and improvement of police responses to potentially violent situations and police management of conflict.

6. Provide for the appointment of FIREARM CONTROL Officers with specified mandates along with Custody Officers, who must supervise the interviewing of prisoners by investigation officers.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND PHYSICAL RESOURCE

Summary of Findings

- a) Major strategic and policy decisions are being made by the Inspector responsible for the Police Information Technology Unit (PITU) in the absence of senior management oversight.
- b) Infrastructure inadequacy and misprioritization are evident and is leading to pre-mature commitment of GoB in the region of Bz \$3 + M.
- c) New technology is merging information technology and communication technology, necessitating a merger between the Signals Unit and the Police Information Technology Unit
- d) Internal Audits of Physical Resources are rare and irregular.
- e) Some property are not recorded nor accounted for.
- f) Procurement procedures are frequently breached.
- g) Procedures for the purchase and use of petrol, oil etc, are easily circumvented.
- h) The main armoury can be entered with little difficulty and Police Headquarters is insecure.
- i) The BPD does not operate a preventive maintenance programme for vehicles or machinery, consequently repair cost is higher than normal.
- j) There are insufficient controls in place to account for the safe custody of arms and ammunition.
- k) Electricity, water and stationery are consumed with near RECKLESS ABANDON with little concern for CONSERVATION and economy.

- l) Police drivers involved in road accidents are held culpable under the Motor Vehicle and Road Traffic Act instead of the higher standard of care under the law of negligence.

Summary of Recommendations

1. The CEO and CoP chair a small IT policy steering group to develop an E. Policing policy and the implementation of IT in keeping with budgets, urgent policing demands and GoB, ICT and

2. IT and Signals Unit be merged into a Communication and Information Technology Resource Unit (CITRU).

3. The PITU should immediately develop software for inventory controls and internal auditing for the department.

4. Staff should be held accountable for breaching GoB procurement rules and the Finance and Audit Act.

5. The armoury be made more secure and managers exercise greater controls over arms, ammunition and radios.

6. An Energy and Water Conservation Officer be appointed for all police facilities.

7. The law of negligence be used to determine culpability of police drivers in road accidents with police vehicles.

COMMUNITY BASED POLICING

Summary of Findings

- a) The management staff of the BPD gives little support to Community Based Policing. The department is not practicing Community BASED policing in

Belize City where it is most needed since neighbourhoods are not the focus for the creation of an active community policing partnership. In Belize City, CBP Unit is practicing community relation and unit beat policing instead.

- b) Neighbourhood watches and Police Citizens Liaison Communities are disappearing due to inattention of District Commanding Officers.
- c) Without Legislation, Citizens Coalition Committees are likely to be sidelined.

Summary of Recommendations

1. The Audit Implementation Team and managers of CYDP help galvanize neighbourhoods in Belize City around the core principles of neighbourhood engagement for crime prevention which is centered on to Community Based Policing (CBP).

2. Neighbourhood Watches be functionally expanded into Tourism Watch, Farmers Watch, and Business Watch etc.

3. Community Based Policing to work more closely with CYDP.

OFFICER SAFETY, HEALTH AND WELFARE

Summary of Findings

- a) There are no formal policies or mechanisms for management to provide for the welfare of members who often work under stressful conditions.
- b) Health and safety issues remain neglected.
- c) Certification in firearm use and First Aid is haphazard.

- d) The lethality gap between low and high calibre weapons is too wide and there is a need for a wider range of non lethal weapons.
- e) Insurance coverage for death and disability of members are too low.
- f) Members should be encouraged and given the time to form a Police Association allowed by law as well as a Commissary.
- g) The department has not developed a fire safety plan.
- h) The departments 2005 HIV/AIDS Policy needs to be reviewed and made compliant with the GoB HIV/ AIDS POLICY 2008.
- i) Living and working conditions are overcrowded, often insanitary, sometimes dilapidated and below minimum tolerable levels at small sub stations.
- j) The department does not cater to the spiritual needs of members.
- k) Engagement in sport activities gets little attention from police managers.
- l) Negotiations about conditions of service are not given the priority it deserves and could be the source of some discontent.

Summary of Recommendations

It is recommended that the CEO and CoP co-chair a small Welfare Task Force to authorize a set of policies and initiatives along with specific performance indicators for the guidance of police managers to act in the interest of the welfare of members.

One BPD Chaplain be appointed for each District and conferred with the honorary rank of Superintendent.

Some of these chaplains should be qualified psychologists to assist with recruiting, in-house testing and COUNSELLING.

That;

- ***The CoP encourage the activation of the Police Association.***
- ***More bullet resistant vests be acquired and issued to staff.***
- ***Improved provisions be made for insurance against death and disability while on duty.***
- ***A Fire Protection Plan be created for all police facilities.***
- ***A commissary and canteen (Officer's Club) legally allowed be established.***
- ***Living conditions at sub stations be improved.***
- ***The Draft Terms and Conditions of Services be negotiated to find consensus and move towards a Cabinet Submission.***
- ***A Senior Officer's Club be established.***

RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

Summary of Findings

- a) Recruit Training sidelines attempts to develop inner directed, ethic based self discipline in recruits, in favour of false assumptions of continuous close over the shoulder supervised discipline after graduation. The syllabus, has failed in objectives to develop good judgement and conflict resolution skills in the recruit.
- b) The recruit is trained to do many things except to deal with people when they are desperate, grieved, angry, frightened or need help or when matters of justice, punishment or retribution are uppermost in their minds during police encounters.
- c) The Academy graduates an average of 8-12 % of all who fail the course along with some assessed to have serious character flaws.
- d) There is an unnecessarily large gender bias against better qualified females resulting in a gender ratio of 1 female to 8 males in the department.
- e) Management is complacent in marketing the career of policing to High School graduates, so SIXTY EIGHT PERCENT of all constables are not educated beyond primary school.

- f) The Ministry of education is not involved in developing the pedagogical skills of the academy's staff.
- g) Knowledge imparted is incorporated within an incestuous loop involving too many police insiders and too little qualified volunteer civilian lecturers/ facilitators.
- h) Too little time and too many obsolete interviewing and assessment techniques are used to select recruits.
- i) The Graduate intake programme is underdeveloped and sporadic.
- j) The taken-for-granted assumptions, general direction and emphasis of recruit training are incongruous with the development of police officers who are self directed, accountable, ethical, self disciplined and service oriented.

Summary of Recommendations

1. The Audit Implementation and Development Team should conduct

2. After graduation the recruit should be assigned to a 14 months long structured police internship programme involving operational duties under select senior tutor constables and directed studies headed by a District Tutor Sergeant. The recruit will learn the applied aspects of policing under direction to properly socialize him/ her in the formative stage of their career. Savings will amount to about \$300,000.00 per 120 recruits.

3. After internship the recruit probationer should undergo an extended interview and series of tests by a panel of select officers and public/ military and civilian volunteer assessors.

4. A civilian with at least a Baccalaureate in the humanities/ behavioural sciences should be appointed Director of Academic Studies for all training and education of members and to introduce programmes of self development to make the BPD a CONTINUOUS LEARNING ORGANIZATION.

5. Simple mechanisms for feedback from different police units to the academy should be created to review areas of weakness in recruits' performance.

6. Ethical behaviour must permeate all aspects of the recruits' life.

7. The Ministry of Education, Civilian Volunteers and the public and the private sectors should be more closely involved in the training and character development of recruits.

8. The designation recruit should be changed to student and a Student Council should be appointed for each class intake.

TRAFFIC CONTROL AND ACCIDENT PREVENTION

Summary of Findings

- a) The National Traffic Branch (NTB) has a comprehensive plan to reduce traffic and educate the public on traffic safety.
- b) The ratio of prosecution and arrests to accidents is above 1:1 which is above average.
- c) Due to the absence of management oversight, no more than 30% of uniformed BPD staff has been issued with Traffic Ticket Books. Too much of traffic policing is left to the Traffic Branch.
- d) Correspondingly the NTB has lost sight of its mandate to deny criminals the use of the road.
- e) The NTB has no radar guns and evidence from its obsolete breathalyzer machine is not accepted in the courts so the cumbersome process of medical examination has to be adopted.

- f) The Motor Vehicle and Road Traffic Act does not provide for
- (1) Vehicle classification and drivers license test for vehicle and drivers transporting HAZARDOUS MATERIAL (Hazmat).
 - (2) The loss of points on driver license for convictions for select offences over a specified time leading to suspension of drivers license.
- g) There are no organized means for City Councils, the Transport Department, Courts and Police to share relevant information. Traffic offenders are slipping through these cracks.
- h) The absence of a Centralized National Traffic Statistics Unit and a Traffic Engineer are hindering the development of national enforcement and traffic safety policies and accident reduction programmes.

Summary of Recommendations

It is recommended that;

1. The NTB staff be trained to reorient them to deny serious

2. A traffic Engineer be employed in the Ministry of Works (Transport) to -among other things- advise and guide the police on road safety and policy issues.

3. Modern breathanalyzers and radar guns be acquired for the NTB.

4. A Central National Traffic Statistics Unit be created.

5. The Motor Vehicle and Road Traffic Act be revised.

6. The BPD order, issue and maintain records of Traffic Ticket Books and tickets issued to all uniformed members.

7. Organized mechanisms be immediately created for the Transport Department, Police, City Councils and Courts to share relevant Traffic information.

8. IT be introduced in phases to integrate the collection sharing, analysis and dissemination of traffic related statistics between the Courts, Town Councils, Police and Traffic Branch including the issuing and recording of fixed penalty tickets.

AUDIT IMPLEMENTATION AND DEVELOPMENT

It is recommended that this team consisting of 2 senior BPD officers and a police advisor be tasked to drive the transformation and development of the BPD.